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Abstract
Noble, Gregory D. Ph.D., Engineering Ph.D. program, Wright State University, 2012.
Inventory Systems with Transshipments and Quantity Discounts.

This research advances knowledge in the area of inventory systems and the
relationship between competing retailers and suppliers of goods. This dissertation studies
retailers that face uncertainty in the demand for goods and who purchase the goods from
a single supplier. A game theoretic methodology is developed to analyze supplier pricing
decisions and retailer quantity decisions and interactions in a competitive transshipment
system where quantity discounts are offered. The system studied differs from previous
work in the subject by introducing quantity discounts from supplier to retailer into a
system of competitive retailers that transship stock. Analysis of these systems focuses on
the identification of potential equilibrium actions by the retailers and how the supplier
can influence the retailers through its choices. This dissertation identifies new criteria for
stability within these systems.

Understanding stable relationships is critical to the

supplier’s ability to influence the system to achieve coordinated, optimal performance. In
a one supplier, two retailer transshipment system, all entities can achieve larger expected
profits when the supplier offers the retailer a pricing contract with a two-block tariff
quantity discount rather than a standard fixed pricing contract. Additionally, the supplier
pricing decisions are examined. This analysis leads to a set of rules for setting the pricing
contract parameters that maximize the supplier’s expected profit. Three quantity discount

iii

schemes are examined in the two retailer transshipment system: a two-block tariff, a twopart tariff, and an all-units discount. The two-block tariff discount results in the largest
expected profit and greatest flexibility for the supplier. The topic is further researched
through the examination of a three retailer system with transshipment and quantity
discounts where there is a central retailer. The examination of this system shows the
potential value to each entity of one of the retailers entering into a transshipment contract
with another retailer.

iv

Table of Contents
Table of Figures ................................................................................................................ vii
Chapter 1:

Introduction ................................................................................................... 1

1.1:

Overview of Chapter Two .................................................................................... 6

1.2:

Overview of Chapter Three .................................................................................. 8

1.3:

Overview of Chapter Four.................................................................................. 13

1.4:

Overview of Chapter Five .................................................................................. 18

Chapter 2:

Literature Review........................................................................................ 22

2.1:

Transshipment .................................................................................................... 22

2.2:

Quantity Discounts ............................................................................................. 30

2.3:

Game Theory ...................................................................................................... 34

Chapter 3:
3.1:

Transshipment Game with Two Retailers and Quantity Discounts ............ 41

The Model .......................................................................................................... 41

3.1.1:

The Exponential Demand Distribution Case .............................................. 50

3.2:

Supplier Profit .................................................................................................... 51

3.3:

Results ................................................................................................................ 52

3.3.1:

Analysis of Potential Equilibrium ............................................................... 52

3.3.2:

Analysis of Retailer Profit .......................................................................... 60

3.3.3:

Analysis of Supplier Profit.......................................................................... 64

3.3.4:

Determining Stability .................................................................................. 65

3.3.5:

Comparison of Models ................................................................................ 67

3.3.6:

Parametric Analysis .................................................................................... 68

Chapter 4:

Three Retailer Transshipment with a Central Retailer ............................... 75

4.1:

The Model .......................................................................................................... 76

4.1.1:

Essential Notation ....................................................................................... 76

4.1.2:

Transshipment Logic .................................................................................. 77
v

4.1.3:

Model Origins ............................................................................................. 79

4.1.4:

Expected Central Retailer Profit ................................................................. 79

4.1.5:

Expected Non-Central Retailer Profit ......................................................... 81

4.1.6:

Event Diagrams ........................................................................................... 82

4.1.7:

Central Retailer Response Function............................................................ 89

4.1.8:

Non-Central Retailer Response Function ................................................... 89

4.2:

Expected Supplier Profit .................................................................................... 90

4.3:

Results ................................................................................................................ 90

4.3.1:

The Retailers’ Response Functions ............................................................. 91

4.3.2:

Supplier Decisions ...................................................................................... 97

4.3.3: Comparison of the Two Retailer and Three Retailer Systems and Retailer
Decisions ................................................................................................................. 106
Chapter 5:
System

Analysis of Different Quantity Discounts in a Two Retailer Transshipment
108

5.1:

Two-Block Tariff Quantity Discount ............................................................... 108

5.2:

A Modified Two-Part Tariff Quantity Discount .............................................. 111

5.3:

All-Units Quantity Discount ............................................................................ 113

5.4:

Comparison of Different Quantity Discounts .................................................. 114

5.5:

The Effects of Different Quantity Discounts on Supplier Decisions ............... 123

Chapter 6:

Summary and Conclusions ....................................................................... 131

References ....................................................................................................................... 138

vi

Table of Figures
Figure 1: Flow Diagram Showing Transshipment .............................................................. 4
Figure 2: Graphical illustration of the transshipment events that occur in the
transshipment with quantity discount model. ..................................................................... 8
Figure 3: Plot of intersecting response functions showing the existence of four potential
equilibrium points for two retailers with a discount triggering quantity at 140. ................ 9
Figure 4: Retailer Profit for different values of the discount triggering quantity,
comparing different ordering quantity combinations. ...................................................... 11
Figure 5: Flow diagram the the three retailer system with a central retailer. ................... 14
Figure 6: Example of a partial transshipment event graph for the three retailer system in
the three dimensional demand space................................................................................. 15
Figure 7: Example response functions for the three retailer system with potential
equilibria A, B, C1a, and C1b. .......................................................................................... 16
Figure 8: Example graph of the retailers’ expected profit for the three retailer system as a
function of the discount triggering quantity. ..................................................................... 17
Figure 9: Comparison of the three quantity discount types for the total cost charged as a
function of the quantity ordered. ....................................................................................... 20
Figure 10: Retailer 2's response to retailer 1's choice of an ordering quantity of 70. ....... 37
Figure 11: Retailer 1's response to retailer 2's choice of an ordering quantity of 135. ..... 37
Figure 12: Retailer 2's response to retailer 1's choice of an ordering quantity of 109. The
quantities are converging to Intersection A. ..................................................................... 38
Figure 13: Retailer 1's response to retailer 2's choice of ordering quantity of 120. Nearly
converged on Intersection A. ............................................................................................ 38
Figure 14: Graphical Illustration of Events in transshipment model ................................ 45
Figure 15: Graphical illustration of the transshipment events that occur in the
transshipment with quantity discount model. ................................................................... 47
Figure 16: Equilibrium point A for a two retailer transshipment model without quantity
discount. ............................................................................................................................ 52
Figure 17: Two curves that determine the response function for a single retailer. ........... 54
Figure 18: Overall response functions for a single retailer with discontinuity from
quantity discount at a quantity of x = 140 ......................................................................... 54
Figure 19: Plot of intersecting response functions showing the existence of four
equilibrium points for two retailers with a quantity discount at x = 140. ......................... 55
Figure 20: Transshipment model with quantity discount where x is large. ...................... 56

vii

Figure 21: Transshipment model with quantity discount, x = 160. Intersections A, C1,
and C2 present................................................................................................................... 57
Figure 22: Transshipment model with quantity discount, x = 110. .................................. 58
Figure 23: Transshipment model with quantity discount, x = 90. .................................... 59
Figure 24: Retailer Profit for different values of x, comparing different ordering quantity
combinations. .................................................................................................................... 61
Figure 25: Supplier Profit for various values of x............................................................. 64
Figure 26: Q1, Q2, and
for cases 1 and 3 as cr changes, cn= 20 ................................ 72
Figure 27: Retailer and Supplier profits for cases 1 and 3 as cr changes, cn= 20 ............. 72
Figure 28: Q1, Q2, and
for cases 1 and 3 as cn changes, cr= 11 ................................ 73
Figure 29: Retailer and Supplier profits for cases 1 and 3 as cn changes, cr= 11 ............. 73
Figure 30: Flow Diagram of Proposed Scenario............................................................... 75
Figure 31: Zero transshipment areas of the three retailer transshipment with quantity
discounts case event graph. ............................................................................................... 83
Figure 32: Zero transshipment areas of the three retailer transshipment with quantity
discounts case event graph. ............................................................................................... 84
Figure 33: Regions representing the transshipment from retailer 1 to retailer 2 of the three
retailer transshipment with quantity discounts case event graph ...................................... 85
Figure 34: Regions representing the transshipment from retailer 3 to retailer 2 of the three
retailer transshipment with quantity discounts case event graph ...................................... 86
Figure 35: Regions representing the transshipment from retailer 2 to retailer 1 of the three
retailer transshipment with quantity discounts case event graph ...................................... 87
Figure 36: Regions representing the transshipment from retailer 2 to retailer 3 of the three
retailer transshipment with quantity discounts case event graph ...................................... 88
Figure 37: Response curves for Qc and Qnc,i; cost from supplier of 13 per unit. .............. 92
Figure 38: Response curves for Qc and Qnc,i; cost from supplier of 23 per unit. .............. 93
Figure 39: Response functions for Qc and Qnc,i, where cn=25 and cr=13. ........................ 94
Figure 40: Response functions for Qc and Qnc,i, where cn=16 and cn=13. ........................ 95
Figure 41: Response functions for Qc and Qnc,i, where cn=18 and cr=13. ........................ 96
Figure 42: Response functions for Qc and Qnc,i, where cn=20 and cr=13. ........................ 97
Figure 43: Expected retailer profit as x changes in the three retailer system where cn=18
cr=13. ................................................................................................................................ 99
Figure 44: Changes in supplier expected profit, central retailer expected profit, and noncentral retailer expected profit as cn changes; cr=13 ....................................................... 102
Figure 45: Changes in supplier expected profit, central retailer expected profit, and noncentral retailer expected profit as cr changes; cn=25 ....................................................... 103
Figure 46: Two-block tariff quantity discount response function. The response functions
are described in detail in… ............................................................................................. 116
Figure 47: Two-part tariff quantity discount response function ..................................... 117
Figure 48: All units quantity discount response function ............................................... 118
viii

Figure 49: Retailer's expected profit as x changes when a two-block tariff quantity
discount is offered. .......................................................................................................... 119
Figure 50: Retailer's expected profit as F changes when a two-part tariff quantity discount
is offered. ........................................................................................................................ 121
Figure 51: Retailer's expected profit as x changes when an all-units quantity discount is
offered. ............................................................................................................................ 122
Figure 52: Excess demand for Retailer 2 and Retailer 3. Excess inventory for Retailer 1.
Transshipment from Retailer 1 to Retailer 2 in the amount of
........................ 182
Figure 53: Excess demand for Retailer 2 and Retailer 3. Excess inventory for Retailer 1.
Transshipment from Retailer 1 to Retailer 2 in the amount of
........................ 183
Figure 54: Excess demand for Retailer 2. Excess inventory for Retailer 1 and Retailer 3.
Transshipment from Retailer 1 to Retailer 2 in the amount of
. .................... 183
Figure 55: Excess demand for Retailer 2. Excess inventory for Retailer 1 and Retailer 3.
Transshipment from Retailer 1 to Retailer 2 in the amount of
........................ 184
Figure 56: Excess demand for Retailer 2. Excess inventory for Retailer 1 and Retailer 3.
Transshipment from Retailer 1 to Retailer 2 in the amount of
.... 184
Figure 57: Excess demand for Retailer 2. Excess inventory for Retailer 1 and Retailer 3.
Transshipment from Retailer 1 to Retailer 2 in the amount of
........................ 185
Figure 58: Excess inventory for Retailer 2 and Retailer 3. Excess demand for Retailer 1.
Transshipment from Retailer 2 to Retailer 1 in the amount of
........................ 185
Figure 59: Excess inventory for Retailer 2 and Retailer 3. Excess demand for Retailer 1.
Transshipment from Retailer 2 to Retailer 1 in the amount of
........................ 186
Figure 60: Excess inventory for Retailer 2. Excess demand for Retailer 1 and Retailer 3.
Transshipment from Retailer 2 to Retailer 1 in the amount of
. .................... 186
Figure 61: Excess inventory for Retailer 2. Excess demand for Retailer 1 and Retailer 3.
Transshipment from Retailer 2 to Retailer 1 in the amount of
........................ 187
Figure 62: Excess inventory for Retailer 2. Excess demand for Retailer 1 and Retailer 3.
Transshipment from Retailer 2 to Retailer 1 in the amount of
. ... 187
Figure 63: Excess inventory for Retailer 2. Excess demand for Retailer 1 and Retailer 3.
Transshipment from Retailer 2 to Retailer 1 in the amount of
........................ 188

ix

Chapter 1: Introduction
An important aspect of managing the logistics and level of customer service for a
firm is making decisions on the inventory systems associated with the firm. The field of
inventory theory which seeks to optimize the costs associated with management of
inventory has a long history. It is essential for firms to implement effective inventory
systems to ensure that items are delivered to customers when they are needed and in the
quantities that are needed, while controlling the costs associated with acquiring and
holding of inventory.

Companies that can effectively manage inventory have a

competitive advantage through potentially higher profits driven by reductions in
inventory holding costs, reductions in required storage space, reductions in the quantity
of lost sales and reductions in unsold inventory. An important and relatively new topic to
the area of inventory theory is the role of supplier control and retailer decisions within a
transshipment system.
The amount of supplier control in multilevel supplier/retailer systems varies from
full control of all aspects, to control over little. Possible aspects that are controllable by
the supplier include, but are not limited to: cost per unit, quantity discount schemes, retail
price, transshipment costs, rules for transshipment of stock, profit sharing agreements,
and distribution schedules. Retailers seek independence in decision making so that retail
systems can be tailored to return more profits and reduce costs for retailers through such
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things as transshipment agreements. The level of control that suppliers and retailers have
determines how each can affect their own and overall expected profits.
Consider this motivating scenario: two competing electronics retailers, Best Buy
and Rex, sell the same flat panel television model from a common supplier, say Vizio.
The retailers decide to cooperate in a limited way based on a transshipment agreement.
The transshipment agreement, which the retailers enter into without direct influence from
the supplier, allows the two retailers to share stock of the item. Due to a short product
life cycle, shipments of this particular television are only delivered to the retailer
locations from the supplier (Vizio) once. After the primary selling season for the
television, the majority of the demand for the item has been realized. If one of the
retailers, Best Buy for example, runs out of stock for the television then Best Buy would
request items from Rex in order to fulfill Best Buy’s unmet demand. Based on the
transshipment agreement, as long as Rex has excess stock of the television after
satisfying their own demand, Rex would send the requested units to Best Buy at an
agreed-upon price. Thus Rex would transship units to Best Buy in this situation. By
doing this, Best Buy avoids the loss of the sale. In the transshipment agreement, the cost
to a retailer that receives a transshipped unit is typically higher than for a unit received
directly from the supplier. Rex benefits from this agreement by selling off inventory that
would otherwise sit unsold. Additionally, each retailer, Best Buy and Rex, may be able
to order fewer units for safety stock because they can rely on each other to help meet
variations in demand. Thus under the correct circumstances both retailers improve
profitability through some combination of increased revenue and/or decreased inventory
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related costs. Figure 1 shows the flow of items in a multi-echelon inventory system with
transshipments.
Another important feature of multi-echelon inventory systems in practice is the
use of quantity-based discounts by suppliers to motivate larger orders from retailers. For
example, Vizio could offer Rex a 10% discount on all units above 100 that Rex orders.
The direct impact of this is that Rex can now potentially sell those units at a higher
margin, or pass the discount along to their customers.
From the perspective of the supplier, quantity discounts serve as a method for
increasing sales, though at a reduced cost per unit. From the perspective of the retailers,
quantity discounts offer a tradeoff of risks. By choosing a larger ordering quantity to take
advantage of a quantity discount offering, the retailers have a reduced risk of unmet
customer demand, but an increased risk of excess inventory. Thus the retailer’s decision
of whether or not to take advantage of a quantity discount relies heavily on both the
salvage value (or inventory holding costs in the case of multi-period models) and the
penalty cost of missed sales. The supplier can use this information to offer a quantity
discount scheme that will be beneficial to both the supplier and retailer.

3

Figure 1: Flow Diagram Showing Transshipment

From the retailer’s perspective transshipment allows for inventory sharing of a
product between locations where there is sufficient demand for that product. The most
common advantage identified in the inventory and supply chain literature from
transshipment is that it allows for lower stock levels to be held at all locations, thus
reducing inventory holding costs.
The interaction of incentives between quantity discounts and transshipment
agreements has not been studied in the past and leads to significant new insights into the
behavior of suppliers and retailers. This dissertation contributes to the existing literature
by studying transshipment systems with quantity discounts involving competing retailers
and a supplier using the quantity discount parameters to exert a coordinating influence on
the system. A significant literature on transshipment systems has appeared within the
past 15 years and includes many different strategies on the utilization of transshipment
systems to improve system performance. Literature on quantity discounts in the various
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models for inventory control has a long history, but has not included its interactions with
transshipment systems.
The recent work in the area of transshipment has shown that transshipment creates
opportunity for improving profits by allowing for lower stock levels to be held by
retailers while achieving the appropriate levels of service (e.g. (Lee, 2007), (Rudi, 2001)).
The existing literature generally studies competing retailers with symmetric
characteristics (costs, demands) as transshipment partners and uses the tools of game
theory to show the existence of optimal equilibrium actions for the retailers where their
ordering quantities are symmetric. In this work we show how quantity discounts, offered
by a single supplier to either two or three independent retailers with symmetric
characteristics, but working as transshipment partners, can lead to optimal equilibrium
actions where their ordering quantities are not symmetric (i.e. unequal ordering
quantities).

Furthermore, the equilibrium identified in this situation can be more

profitable to both the retailers and the supplier. The retailers naturally agree to this
arrangement in an equilibrium that has non-symmetric ordering quantities for the
retailers, yet achieves an equal division of profits between the retailers. The supplier’s
careful choice of the quantity discount scheme is able to achieve this equal division of
profits without an explicit profit sharing agreement among the retailers.

In these

situations, the retailers choose to offer limited cooperation through the transshipment
agreement, and the supplier fills a coordinating role that leads to improved performance
for both retailers and the supplier.
The benefit for the retailers is improved profitability from the additional decisionmaking flexibility flowing from the transshipment relationships and in potentially
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achieving sales volumes that engage the quantity discount. The additional power of this
analysis for the supplier is that with the identification of the multiple equilibrium actions
that the retailers can take, as a function of the quantity discount parameters, the supplier
can now consider how the quantity discount parameters create an opportunity for
coordinating the behavior of competing retailers to benefit the supplier, the retailers, or
the overall system. This can be accomplished without direct control of the ordering
process of the retailers. This is particularly important because in these systems we
assume that the retailers make choices independent of the direct control of the supplier,
and thus it is advantageous for the supplier to understand the impact of optimization by
each retailer and competition between the retailers so that the supplier can create
incentives for improved performance.
The basis of the model for each retailer is the newsvendor model, which is a
classic model in inventory theory that models the decision of an inventory manager
facing an uncertain demand by trading off 1) the cost of inventory to help meet demand
and 2) the cost of shortages from unsuccessfully fulfilling the demand.

In the

newsvendor model, the decision maker purchases stock at the beginning of a time period,
can salvage it at the end of a time period, and can no longer sell it during the following
time periods. The model of transshipments within a one-warehouse, two-retailer, multiechelon inventory system is based on the transshipment model of (Rudi, 2001).

1.1:

Overview of Chapter Two

Chapter two discusses the relevant background information including the areas of
transshipments, quantity discounts, and game theory. The research discussed in this
chapter lays the ground work for the research discussed in this dissertation. Most notably
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(Rudi, 2001) provides the basis for the model developed in chapter three. (Rudi, 2001)
compares both decentralized and centralized transshipment systems and makes
comparisons between the two systems.

It is evident from the recent literature that

transshipment systems lead to lower stock levels for the retailers. Additionally, the
combination of lower stock levels in conjunction with the possibility of retailers having
their unmet demand met by a transshipment partner and the possibility of fulfilling
another retailer’s unmet demand with excess inventory leads to increased net profit. In
the examples that were studied, increases in retailer profit. Though not always feasible,
the transshipment systems can be further improved through central coordination of
inventory ordering quantities rather than decentralized, competing retailers. Additionally,
(Dolan, 1987) provides the formulations of various quantity discounts. These are the
basis of the comparison of models found in chapter 5. The literature on the topic of
quantity discounts also covers supplier pricing decisions, retailer ordering decisions, and
the relationship between the supplier and retailers. In some cases, centralized ordering
and distribution rather than decentralized ordering can be considered as an option when
making ordering decisions. Chapter 2 also discusses game theory as it applies to this
research. The concept of a Nash equilibrium is summarized, which is essential to the
game theoretic approach taken to solve transshipment problems. Foresight of other
players’ reactions to one’s own actions is a central component in analysis based on game
theory. The amount of foresight that a player has not only influences the decisions that
are made by that player, but also affects the end results as well (e.g. ordering quantities,
profits, etc.).
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1.2:

Overview of Chapter Three

Chapter three discusses a competitive two retailer transshipment game with
quantity discounts. This section covers the formulation of the model as well as an
example with results.

The expected profit model as well as the optimal response

functions of the retailers and transshipment event graphs are given in this chapter. Figure
2 shows the transshipment event graph for the transshipment with quantity discounts
model. A transshipment event graph labels regions in the retailers’ demand space with
the direction and quantity of transshipment. Transshipment event graphs are important as
an aid to understanding the way that transshipment works within the model.

The

different regions in the event graph are determined by the transshipment rules as they
relate to each retailer’s demand and ordering quantity.

Figure 2: Graphical illustration of the transshipment events that occur in the
transshipment with quantity discount model.
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Optimization of the model leads to an analysis of optimal response functions for the
retailers, focusing on the existence of equilibrium points as a function of the quantity
discount parameters chosen by the supplier. An optimal response function is a function
describing a retailer’s optimal ordering quantity based upon the other retailer’s ordering
quantity. An equilibrium point is the intersection of two response functions, one for each
retailer. Based on a derivative approach to profit maximization, when at an equilibrium,
neither retailer has an incentive to change their quantities to improve their profit. An
example of response functions and the resulting potential equilibria is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Plot of intersecting response functions showing the existence of four
potential equilibrium points for two retailers with a discount triggering quantity at
140.

This chapter defines the requirements for a stable point and analyzes the expected
supplier and retailer profits. The expected profits are used in conjunction with the
retailers’ response functions to determine the best supplier and retailer decisions. The
supplier specifies the pricing contract through a normal cost per unit, reduced price per
9

unit, and a discount triggering quantity.

A stable point is a value of the discount

triggering quantity where an equilibrium can be obtained on which all retailers will have
their highest possible expected profit for that particular value of the discount triggering
quantity. The identification of stable points in the analysis is essential in order to ensure
that the retailers do not jockey to obtain a position of higher profit.

This type of

jockeying can lead to a suboptimal set of ordering quantities due to their competitive
relationship.
Figure 4 shows an example of the retailers’ expected profits as a function of the
discount triggering quantity. Note that the existence of the equilibria is a function of the
discount triggering quantity. Also, for the two retailer model, there is only one stable
point when all of the equilibria are in existence. In Figure 4, this is the point at which the
blue and yellow profit lines cross for the two retailers. From Figure 4 the supplier can
gather information on the existence of the equilibria, retailer stability, and expected
retailer profit. The supplier uses this information to choose pricing parameters that lead
to stable solutions which result in higher profit for both the supplier and retailers.
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Figure 4: Retailer Profit for different values of the discount triggering quantity,
comparing different ordering quantity combinations.

Through examples, the characteristics of retailer behavior are demonstrated with a study
of expected profits from both the retailer’s perspective and the supplier’s perspective.
Using the two-block tariff quantity discount price structure in a transshipment
model results in the two retailers having four potential equilibrium ordering quantity
combinations to consider, rather than just one when the supplier does not offer a pricing
contract with a quantity discount. Two of the potential retailer equilibrium combinations
have symmetric retailer ordering quantities, while the other two potential retailer
equilibrium combinations have non-symmetric ordering quantities. This is in spite of
otherwise symmetric cost and demand parameters.
The quantity discount cost parameters are chosen by the supplier. Strategically,
the new analysis shows that the supplier should choose the pricing parameters within a
11

range so that the retailers have a non-symmetric equilibrium to consider, since this can
lead to the highest profits for the supplier. Also, the supplier must carefully choose the
quantity within the range that contains the non-symmetric equilibrium so that the retailers
have equal profits, allowing the equilibrium to be stable, as defined below. When the
supplier is successful in coordinating the retailer’s actions, we find that the supplier’s
profit will be largest when the value of the non-discounted cost per unit from the supplier
is as large as is feasible and the value of discounted cost per unit from the supplier is as
small as is feasible. Decreasing the value of the discounted cost per unit from the
supplier also increases both retailers’ profits, while increasing the value of the nondiscounted cost per unit from the supplier decreases both retailers’ profits.
We further extend the understanding of equilibrium behavior in these systems.
Due to the retailers’ competitive relationship, they could jockey for position among the
potential equilibriums so that they receive a higher profit for themselves and the other
retailer receives a lower profit. A stable value of the discount triggering quantity is
defined as a value of discount triggering quantity where the expected profit for one
retailer is equal to the expected profit for the other retailer and the two retailers are at an
equilibrium that has a larger expected profit for both retailers than any other equilibrium
that is in existence for a particular value of the discount triggering quantity. Using this
definition we find that a single value of the discount triggering quantity exists that results
in the two symmetric retailers having different ordering quantities. Additionally, for this
value of the discount triggering quantity, the expected profit for both retailers and the
supplier is greater than that of the transshipment model without quantity discounts.
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This research on a two retailer transshipment system with quantity discounts is
significant to the current literature on transshipment because it shows that the optimal
ordering quantities for the retailers have the following properties:
1

Satisfy the first order equilibrium conditions

2

Are not symmetric for the two retailers even though the quantity discount
offered to the two retailers by the supplier is identical, all costs are
symmetric for the two retailers, and the two retailers are competitive and
thus not cooperating in making ordering quantity decisions.

3

Result in improved profits for each retailer over the symmetric equilibrium
solutions.

4

1.3:

Result in improved profits for the supplier.

Overview of Chapter Four

Chapter four discusses a system with three retailers and one supplier that offers a
quantity discount. This system extends the two-retailer, one supplier system of Chapter
three. One of the retailers serves as a “central retailer” which can transship with either of
the other two “non-central” retailers. A graphical representation of this system is shown
in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Flow diagram the the three retailer system with a central retailer.

The model for the three retailer system is first derived and verified. Event graphs,
response functions, and example profit graphs are all provided in this chapter. The
models for this system are much more complicated than the two retailer transshipment
system.

The complexity is mostly a result of the three dimensionality of the

transshipment event space. Based on a study of the current literature, no work exists for
such a system with three retailers with or without quantity discounts. Because this
system shares many similarities with the two retailer system, direct comparisons can be
made to determine the value to each entity within the system of one of the retailers
entering into a transshipment agreement with another retailer.

Figure 6 shows an

example of a partial transshipment event graph for the three retailer system. The graph
shows the space created from the three retailer demands and the regions within represent
transshipment events. Like in the two retailer system, the event graphs here are important
as an aid to understanding the way that transshipment works within the model. Since this
model has not been seen previously in literature, the three-dimensional transshipment
event graphs are very important here for verifying that the retailer expected profit model
14

is correct. The different regions in the event graph are determined by the transshipment
rules as they relate to each retailer’s demand and ordering quantity. Regions differ from
each other by the amount of inventory being transshipped and the direction of the
transshipment.

Figure 6: Example of a partial transshipment event graph for the three retailer
system in the three dimensional demand space.

A game theoretic approach is used to determine the best supplier and retailer decisions
within the three retailer system. Response functions for the three retailer system are
found in order to determine the potential equilibria as shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Example response functions for the three retailer system with potential
equilibria A, B, C1a, and C1b.

The axes in Figure 7 represent the ordering quantities for the central retailer (vertical axis)
and either of the two non-central retailers (horizontal axis). In this case, the non-central
retailers have identical response functions.

The central retailer’s response function

differs from the non-central retailers’ response functions as seen in Figure 7. From the
response functions, the range of existence for each of the equilibria can be determined
and the expected profit graph for the retailers can be created as shown in Figure 8.
Identifying stable equilibrium points requires careful analysis using Figure 8 over
different regions of the discount triggering quantity.
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Figure 8: Example graph of the retailers’ expected profit for the three retailer
system as a function of the discount triggering quantity.

The research presented in this chapter also serves to determine the benefits and
disadvantages to this system compared to the two retailer system. Through analyzing this
system with a game theoretic approach, for the cases that were studied, the following
changes occur to the expected profits:
1

Two retailers currently in a transshipment agreement have a decrease in
expected profit if either of them takes on another transshipment partner
(going from two to three retailers transshipping).

2

A retailer who previously operated independently as a standard
newsvendor where quantity discounts are offered sees an increase in
expected profit by entering in the transshipment agreement with the
central retailer.
17

3

The central retailer has a greater expected profit than each of the two noncentral retailers.

4

The supplier has an increase in expected profit over the two retailer
system.

Consider two retailers that already have a two way transshipment agreement. If a
third retailer joins into an transshipment agreement with one of the two original retailers,
then both of the retailers currently in a transshipment agreement will have a decrease in
expected profit. When the choice to enter into an additional transshipment contract
belongs to the retailers and not the supplier, neither of two retailers that currently have a
transshipment agreement should enter into a transshipment agreement with another
retailer based on the parameters we studied in chapter four. If however one of them does
enter into transshipment agreement with another retailer, then the retailer that was not
originally part of the transshipment agreement and the supplier would have an increase in
expected profit. Thus, the supplier and the independent retailer should be in favor of the
additional transshipment agreement as both of them will experience an increase in
expected profit.

1.4:

Overview of Chapter Five

In chapter five three different quantity discount types are compared to determine
how the choice of discount type influences the behavior of retailers, suppliers and their
potential profit.

The quantity discount types are evaluated in the two retailer

transshipment with quantity discounts system from chapter three.
Three types of quantity discounts are compared in this chapter: a two-block tariff
quantity discount, a modified two-part tariff quantity discount, and an all-units quantity

18

discount. In a two-block tariff quantity discount a normal price is charged per unit
purchased below a discount triggering quantity. Units purchased above the discount
triggering quantity are charged a discounted price per unit. In a two-part tariff quantity
discount a fixed cost is charged for the right to purchase any number of units at a uniform
price per unit. In an all-units quantity discount if a discount triggering quantity is
exceeded, a discounted price per unit is applied to all units. If the discount triggering
quantity is not exceeded then the normal cost per unit is charged. Figure 9 shows a side
by side comparison of the three quantity discount types focusing on the the total cost
charged by the supplier to the retailer as a function of the quantity ordered. When
compared in the two retailer transshipment system, chapter five demonstrates that the
two-block tariff quantity discount is the best choice for the supplier.

The two-block

tariff quantity discount is a better option for the supplier than the two-part tariff quantity
discount. This is due to both having equal profits for equilibria that exist when either
quantity discount scheme is used and the two-block tariff quantity discount having more
potential equilibria available. The two-block tariff quantity discount is better than the allunits quantity discount due to the more potential equilibria available to the two-block
tariff quantity discount and a expected supplier profit that is at least as good as the allunits quantity discount for potential equilibria that both have in common. This result is
based on discount triggering quantity flexibility (due to retailer stability) and expected
supplier profit.
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Figure 9: Comparison of the three quantity discount types for the total cost charged
as a function of the quantity ordered.

A comparison between the two-block tariff quantity discount and a modified twopart tariff quantity discount shows that their response functions have similar components.
How these components are composed into the complete response function differentiates
the two approaches. For the two-block tariff quantity discount there is a discontinuity in
the response function at the discount triggering quantity. The two-part tariff quantity
discount does not have this discontinuity in its response function. Aside from this
difference, the response functions are the same; resulting in the same potential equilibria.
Using the stability criteria developed in chapter two, the two-block tariff quantity
discount has four potential equilibria (A, B, C1, and C2, shown in Figure 3) for the
retailers to choose from. When the stability criteria are applied to the two-part tariff
quantity discount model the retailers can choose from only two potential equilibria (C1
and C2). Though the expected profits are the same for the C1 and C2 equilibria between
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both types, the two-block tariff quantity discount is preferred by the supplier due to the
flexibility in stable regions and larger amount of choices for the discount triggering
quantity over the two-part tariff quantity discount.
When comparing the two-block tariff quantity discount to the all-units quantity
discount chapter five shows that the two-block tariff quantity discount is preferred over
the all-units quantity discount because of increased expected profits and flexibility. The
all-units quantity discount results in only two potential equilibria (A and B), while the
two-block tariff quantity discount results in the existence of all four potential equilibria
(A, B, C1, and C2) and thus is more flexible than the all-units quantity discount. The
analysis in chapter five proves that when the retailers order according to Equilibrium B,
the expected supplier profit for the two-block tariff quantity discount case is strictly
greater than for the all-units quantity. The only time that the expected supplier profit
between the two cases is equal is when the two retailers order according to Equilibrium
A. When the retailers order according to any other equilibrium, the two-block tariff
quantity discount either has a greater expected profit for the supplier or the equilibria do
not exist in the all-units quantity discount case, in which case the two-block tariff
quantity discount has the possibility of their existence.
Chapter six summarizes the main results and discusses possible future work.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
This chapter includes background information on three areas relevant to this
research: transshipment, quantity discounts, and game theory.

The section on

transshipment explains the process of transshipment and summarizes recent research that
is relevant to the topics in this dissertation. All the references described here assume that
the retailers have independent demands where customers do not switch between retailers,
unless it is specifically noted. The section on quantity discounts gives an overview of the
different types of quantity discount models focusing on the more recent work that is
relevant to the research presented in this proposal. The final section presents relevant
topics in the area of game theory.

2.1:

Transshipment

(Paterson, 2011) constructs a review on inventory models with lateral
transshipments. The review of literature identifies articles by various characteristics of
the system being evaluated such as the number of echelons and symmetry between the
retailers. Articles are also identified by the type of ordering policies and transshipment
characteristics used.
According to (Hanany, 2009) transshipments are the movement of stock in the
same echelon level. In a transshipment system with two retailers, one will transship
excess inventory to the other when it is needed based on customer demand. Assuming
that it is cost advantageous for the two retailers to do so, once demand is realized, if there
is both a retailer with excess stock and a retailer with excess demand, the retailer with
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excess stock will transship up to enough stock to meet the other retailer’s excess demand
in order to avoid taking a loss for the excess inventory. This also benefits the retailer
with excess demand because the transshipment allows the retailer’s demand to be met
when the other retailer has excess stock. For example, assume that retailer 1 and retailer
2 each have 60 units of stock available. Also assume that the realized demand is 50 units
for retailer 1 and 65 units for retailer 2. Retailer 1 can improve the level of service to
retailer 2 customers by transshipping 5 units to retailer 2. This also benefits retailer 1
because excess stock not needed to serve retailer 1 customers would be sold to retailer 2.
Retailer 2 benefits by receiving immediately needed stock from retailer 1 to meet the
previously unmet 5 units of demand, though possibly at a higher unit price than if sourced
directly from the supplier. Additionally, when this additional source of transshipped
supply is considered, both retailers benefit by being able to reduce their ordering
quantities from the product supplier and earn higher average profits than they would
without using transshipments (Rudi, 2001).
(Rudi, 2001) shows that when transshipment is used, retailer orders at each
location may not be optimal for the retailer, depending on how the performance of the
system is being optimized. More specifically, a comparison is made between systems
where local decision makers optimize their own performance and systems where a single
central decision maker optimizes the overall performance.

In this model high

transshipment prices (the amount received by a retailer to transship its excess inventory)
make it profitable for each firm to carry more inventory, while lower transshipment
prices make it more profitable for each firm to rely on the other firms for transshipments
to handle high demand. A newsvendor model is used to determine the best inventory
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levels to get the maximum average profit per firm. (Rudi, 2001) shows that the average
profit per firm is higher when using central coordination than when the local decision
makers seek to optimize their own profits.
In (Xiao, 2008) a transshipment game between two retailers with seasonal
products is examined. The problem examined in (Xiao, ,2008) is similar to the problem
examined in (Rudi, 2001) with a few differences which include the option to reject a
transshipment request and the possibility that unmet demand will attempt to be met by the
other retailer.

Similar to (Rudi, 2001) they compare a decentralized transshipment

system, a centralized transshipment system and a system without transshipment. Their
results indicate that the centralized system has the highest joint revenue and that the
decentralized system underperforms the centralized system in total joint revenue but
outperforms the system without transshipment.

(Xiao, 2008) concludes through

numerical experiments that although transshipment can increase revenue for both retailers
in some cases. In other cases the competition between the retailers can result in a loss in
the joint revenue.
In (Zhao, 2009) an analysis of transshipment between two competing retailers is
carried out. Two games are studied; a transshipment game and a substitution game. For
each game the existence of a general pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is established for
retail and safety stocks. The model follows closely to a single period newsvendor model.
Decisions in this scenario include the price at which to transship, the inventory kept, and
when to transship inventory to a competing retailer. After an analysis, it was found that
the models are mainly dependent on transshipment price and the chance that a sale is lost.
It is also found that transshipment is less attractive as the degree of competition increases,
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which is measured through the likelihood and cost of customers switching from one
retailer to another. They also found that transshipment between retailers never leads to a
lower retail price and never leads to a higher level of safety stock, so there is no benefit to
customers.
In (Zou, 2010), an analytical model is developed in order to examine a system
where there is transshipment between two competing firms. They find that transshipment
systems might not be cost effective for firms if the firms are operating in an environment
where customers are likely to switch from a firm that is experiencing a stockout to a firm
with available inventory. In such environments, customers are less loyal to the firms and
the firms are more competitive towards each other which results in a higher customer
switching rate. The authors find that in these cases it is more beneficial to the firms to
allow the customers to switch to another firm instead of utilizing transshipment.
However, they do find that it is beneficial for the firms to use transshipment when there is
high customer loyalty. Additionally they find that when both firms are identical in
market demand and cost parameters that there exists a unique transshipment price that is
optimal for both firms. In contrast, when the two firms are not identical in market
demand and cost parameters, the firm which has a lower penalty cost or a smaller demand
variance will prefer a lower transshipment price and receive more benefits than the other
firm from transshipment.
In (Wong, 2005), a system where a company shares its spare parts for repairs is
explored.

A distinction is made between lateral transshipments and delayed lateral

transshipments, where lateral transshipments occur when there are no backorders in the
system and it is triggered by an item failure, where delayed lateral transshipments occur
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when the system has backorders and it is triggered by a repair completion.

They

formulate a multi-dimensional Markovian Model examining various combinations with
or without delayed lateral transshipment and zero or non-zero lateral transshipment. It is
shown that through the use of delayed lateral transshipments, the expected number of
backorders can be significantly reduced.

This (Wong, 2005) also notes that the

assumption of instantaneous lateral transshipment can lead to non-optimal inventory
stocking decisions, especially in cases where lateral transshipments do not occur very fast
and, in cases for repairs, when the cost of unit-down time is high.
The focus of (Zhao, 2006) is an inventory transshipment problem in a
decentralized dealer network. A game theory approach is used to determine inventory
strategies of the individual dealers. Dynamic programming is used to prove that the
optimal policy for an individual dealer is a stationary (S, K, Z) policy, where S is the
base-stock level, K is the threshold rationing level (when a dealer should fill a request),
and Z is the requesting level (when a dealer should send out a request). It is found that
high-volume dealers are more sensitive to the cost of transshipment in their choice of the
stocking and rationing levels than low-volume dealers, whereas low-volume dealers are
more sensitive to the cost of transshipment in their choice of the requesting level.
Additionally it is found that when the incentive for transshipment increases
(manufacturer incentives, etc.), in a small dealer network, dealers decrease their rationing
and stocking levels, whereas in a large dealer network, dealers respond by decreasing
their rationing levels and increasing their stocking levels.
(Herer, 2001) defines the dynamic transshipment problem.

(Herer, 2001)

analyzes a system where transshipments are used between two retailers in a dynamic
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deterministic demand environment over a finite planning horizon.

The goal is to

determine the amount of stock to order from a single supplier and the amount of
inventory to transship each time period while minimizing costs. A polynomial time
algorithm is developed to determine the optimal strategy for the dynamic transshipment
problem for the two retailers over a finite planning horizon. The dynamic transshipment
problem is further examined in (Herer, 2003) through the addition of multiple retailers.
In (Herer, 2003) a multi-location supply chain where transshipments are allowed is
analyzed. The targeted scenario by (Herer, 2003) is a dynamic deterministic demand
environment where each location has known demand for each period and the locations
are centrally controlled. It is shown that problem is NP-hard. An optimal algorithm is
developed in order to solve instances of the problem with fewer retailers. Additionally, a
heuristic algorithm is developed in order to solve instances where the number of retailers
is large.
(Lien 2011) Introduces chain configurations in transshipment systems where each
entity is linked through a single connected loop. It is shown that a chain configuration
has advantages over the configurations suggested in literature.

In addition they

demonstrate the efficiency and robustness of chain configurations for more general
scenarios and provide managerial insights regarding preferred configurations for different
problem parameters.
(Shao 2011) examines transshipment incentives in a decentralized supply chain
where a single supplier is available to distribute product to independent retailers. It is
shown that the manufacturer prefers to set the transshipment price as high as possible,
whereas retailers prefer a lower transshipment price. Transshipment incentives in a
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system where the retailers are under joint ownership are also examined because the
transshipment price does not play a role. It is found that when the decentralized retailers
control the transshipment price, a lower price is chosen, which results in higher profits for
the retailers and lower profit for the supplier. Thus, the supplier prefers to work with
retailers under a joint ownership rather than independent retailers.
(Hu, 2007) examines a two-location production/inventory model where each
location makes production decisions and is subject to uncertain capacity. (Hu, 2007)
seeks to find the existence of a set of coordinating transshipment prices that induce the
local decision makers to make inventory and transshipment decisions that are globally
optimal.

Sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of a unique pair of

coordinating transshipment prices are derived. It is shown that coordinating prices may
exist for only a narrow range of problem parameters and (Hu, 2007) explores conditions
for when this can happen. Additionally, a study is performed on the effects of demand
and capacity variability on the magnitude of coordinating transshipment prices.
(Wanke, 2009) presents a framework for deciding whether and how inventories
should be pooled, using the consolidation effect as a cornerstone tool to measure
inventory costs, service levels, and total costs. Sensitivity analyses on mathematical
expressions are performed to determine when one alternative is preferable in terms of
total costs. Real settings are also presented for the framework developed.
(Olsson 2009) examines a single-echelon inventory system with two identical
locations. It is assumed that each location applies a (R, Q) policy and shows that the
optimal policies are not necessarily symmetric even though the locations are identical.
The optimal policies are chosen based on the minimizing the joint costs from the two
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retailers. (Olsson, 2010) examines a similar system with the main difference being
unilateral transshipment.
(Huang, 2010) studies a newsvendor game with transshipments, where n retailers
face a stochastic demand for an identical product. Two methods for distribution of
residual profit are compared; transshipment prices and dual allocations. Transshipment
prices are selected before the demand is known; dual allocations are obtained by
calculating the dual prices for the transshipment problem and are calculated after
observing the true demand. It is shown that neither allocation method dominates the
other. For n retailers they recommend a transshipment price agreement where a neutral
central depot is used to coordinate the transshipments over a dual allocation agreement
because of the ease of implementation.
(Seifert, 2006) compares integrated and dedicated supply chains. (Seifert, 2006)
develops and solves mathematical models for dedicated and integrated supply chains. It
is shown that the cost savings can be significant and that both retailers and customers
benefit from an integrated supply chain. An analysis is also performed on how the
optimal solutions depend on the characteristics of the supply chain and identify
conditions under which it would be optimal to operate the virtual store without dedicating
any inventory to the virtual store.
(Comez, 2012) studies a decentralized system of competing retailers.

Here

retailers have the option of rejecting a transshipment request. Each retailer decides on the
initial order quantity and on the acceptance/rejection of each transshipment request. For
two retailers it is shown that the retailers’ optimal transshipment polices are dynamic and
characterized by chronologically nonincreasing inventory holdback levels.
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The

sensitivity of holdback levels is analytically studied and it is found that smaller retailers
and geographically distant retailers benefit more from transshipments.
(Dong, 2004) studies the affects of both exogenous and endogenous wholesale
prices on retailers and suppliers. When an exogenous wholesale price is used, the
supplier is a price taker and cannot affect the wholesale price. When an endogenous
wholesale price is used, the supplier can set the wholesale price. It is found that the
supplier benefits from retailers’ transshipments by charging a higher wholesale price,
while retailers are worse off.
(Lee, 2007) proposes a new lateral transshipment policy, called service level
adjustment. This policy differs from previous policies by integrating emergency lateral
transshipment with preventative lateral transshipment to efficiently respond to customer
demands. Emergency lateral transshipment mandates emergency redistribution from a
retailer with ample stock to a retailer that has reached stockout. Preventive lateral
transshipment reduces risk by redistributing stock between retailers that anticipate
stockout before the realization of customer demands. Additionally, the proposed policy
considers the service level to decide the quantity for lateral transshipment.

2.2:

Quantity Discounts

A quantity discount is a pricing discount offered by a supplier to a customer for
units above a specified purchase quantity.

From a supplier’s perspective, quantity

discounts offer a means to entice retailers to purchase more units than they normally
would. The supplier gains the advantage of selling more units but may not necessarily
make more profit due to selling the units at a cheaper price.

From a retailer’s

(customer’s) perspective, quantity discounts offer a way to purchase units for a cheaper
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price; however, the supplier usually requires the retailer to purchase more units than the
retailer would normally purchase in order to receive units at a discounted price.
Three types of quantity discounts are described by (Dolan, 1987). The first of the
quantity discounts described by (Dolan, 1987) is a two-part tariff. When a two-part tariff
is in effect the customer pays a fixed cost F for the right to purchase any amount of goods
at a uniform price p. The total charge to the retailer for quantity q,

in a two-part

tariff is:

Another quantity discount, a two-block tariff, is a quantity discount in which a price p1 is
charged per unit for all units up to a quantity x and all units purchased greater than x are
charged a price p2 per unit (where p1 > p2).

The third quantity discount model described by (Dolan, 1987) is an All-units quantity
discount. In an All-units quantity discount model once a quantity level x is exceeded, a
discounted price is applied to all units such that:

In this dissertation a two-block tariff quantity discount is used.
(Burnetas, 2007) examines how a supplier can use quantity discounts to influence
the stocking decisions in a newsvendor system.

Two different quantity discount

structures are explored; an all-unit discount and two-block tariff quantity discount.
Assumptions are made regarding the amount of information that the supplier knows about
the buyer’s demand. It is assumed that the supplier only knows the possible demand
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distributions of the buyer, and that the exact demand distribution is known to the buyer.
Three different methods for the supplier to offer buyers; fixed packages, all-units quantity
discount and two-block tariff quantity discounts, are compared. In this setting, an all-unit
discount is always better than the two-block tariff quantity discount from the perspective
of the supplier. Additionally, a fixed package pricing system results in the supplier
earning larger profits than when using the all-unit discount or the two-block tariff
quantity discount.
(Anand, 2008) uses a dynamic model to show that strategic inventories play a role
in vertical contracts. A two-part tariff quantity discount is used as an example where in
each period the buyers have the option of paying the fixed cost plus a cost per unit or
purchase zero units at no cost. It is shown that the supplier pricing decisions are a
function of the buyer’s holding cost, such that when the buyer’s holding costs are high,
inventories are not held and thus do not affect the buyer and supplier decisions; however,
when the holding cost is lower, inventories can play a role and affect buyer and supplier
decisions.
(Munson, 2010) provides methodologies to calculate optimal ordering quantities
for four different strategic purchasing configurations when either an all-units quantity
discount or an incremental quantity discount is used.

The different configurations

include: complete decentralization, centralized pricing with decentralized purchasing,
centralized purchasing with local distribution, and centralized purchasing with
warehousing. It is shown through numerical example that the purchasing configuration
can have a significant impact on costs. It is also shown through numerical example that
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under certain conditions, an incremental quantity discount schedule may reduce the
incentive to order larger quantities than the all-units schedule.
(Shin, 2010) shows that the magnitude of optimal discounts that are scheduled by
deterministic quantity discount models are not always large enough to cover the buyer’s
additional inventory stocking risks. A model is proposed that allows the supplier to
identify a discount level that shares the buyer’s increased risk that is associated with a
temporary overstocking and ensures that both the buyer and the supplier benefit from the
model. The proposed model includes a flexible supplier discount offer that is dependent
on the magnitude of the buyer’s demand variability.
(Kokangul, 2009) uses an integrated analytical hierarchy process and
mathematical programming to solve the problem of supplier selection when quantity
discounts are present. Mathematical programming is used in order to maximize the total
value of purchase, minimize the total cost of purchase, and simultaneously maximize the
total value of purchase and minimize the total cost of purchase. The analytical hierarchy
process uses a pairwise comparison to calculate a weight for each of the suppliers which
are then assigned as coefficients in the objective function to determine the optimal order
quantities from each of the available suppliers.
(Chang, 2006) proposes a mixed integer formulation is for a single item multisupplier system with variable lead-time, price-quantity discount, and resource constraints.
(Chang, 2006) claims that the global optimal solution from the proposed model is better
than the local optimal solution obtained by heuristic procedures in traditional methods.
Examples are used to show the effectiveness of the model.
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2.3:

Game Theory

Game theory attempts to model players’ behavior in strategic situations where a
player makes decisions based upon other players’ decisions. According to (Rasmusen,
2007) game theory is a modeling tool that is “concerned with the actions of decision
makers who are conscious that their actions affect each other.”

Situations where

decisions are made based upon the decisions of others can be considered a game and thus
modeled via game theory. For example, the owners of two competing gas stations
choosing the price to sell gas at their stations could be modeled via game theory. Each
owner’s decision of price to sell their gas affects the other owner’s decision. Situations
where decision makers do not consider the decisions of others when making their
decisions, such as a company interviewing candidates for a job position, are not
considered a game and are not modeled via game theory. Game theory examines both
cooperative and non-cooperative games. Games where there is competition with no
explicit agreement between the players to cooperate, for example two competing
retailers, are considered non-cooperative games. Games where coalitions are formed are
considered cooperative games. Coalitions are groups formed that are composed of a
subset of the players in the game that explicitly cooperate in decision making rather than
competing as in a non-cooperative game.
(Rasmusen, 2007) describes four essential components of a model based on noncooperative game theory. The four essential components are players, actions, payoffs,
and information. Players are entities that make decisions. Each player’s goal is to
maximize his or her expected payoff through his or her decisions. An action is a choice
that a player can make. A payoff is the utility that a player receives after all decisions
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have been made and thus the game has ended. A player’s information includes the
payoffs of the different variables and the knowledge of the actions that have previously
been taken.

Together the players, actions, payoffs, and information allow for the

adequate description of a game in order for it to be modeled.
John F. Nash has made many contributions to the area of game theory through
(Nash, 1950), titled “The Bargaining Problem”, which examined a two-person bargaining
situation, and (Nash, 1951), titled “Non-Cooperative Games”, which led to the term
“Nash equilibrium.”

(Nash, 1951) examines a scenario where the players act

independently of each other, meaning that no coalitions are formed. The contributions
made by (Nash, 1951) include defining equilibrium points and proving that a finite noncooperative game always has one or more equilibrium points. The equilibrium points
described in (Nash, 1951), which are also mentioned in (Nash, 1950b), would later be
known as a Nash equilibrium. (Epstein, 2009) defines a Nash equilibrium as “a set of
strategies and corresponding payoffs such that no player can benefit by changing his
strategy while the strategies of all other players are held invariant.”

Additionally

(Epstein, 2009) explains that at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists for
games with a finite amount of players and a finite set of strategies. Additionally the Nash
equilibrium for zero-sum games is a minimax equilibrium.
In non-cooperative game theory, response functions describe the response of one
player to the other player’s decisions. A response function shows the action a player will
take with the knowledge of the other player’s action. In a non-cooperative game, the
response function describes how a player reacts to the opposing player, since there is no
opportunity for cooperation between the players. The response functions are important to
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the competitive transshipment problem because they indicate what one retailer’s actions
will be in response to the other’s actions.

Response functions can be plotted

simultaneously in order to determine the actions for all players that constitute a Nash
equilibrium. Consider a situation similar to (Rudi, 2001) where two retailers must choose
order quantities in a competitive game situation. Plotting the two response functions
(response of player 1 to the actions of player 2, and the response of player 2 to the actions
of player 1) graphically reveals the set of equilibria for the two retailers for a specific set
of parameters. Using the graphs it can be seen that the retailers’ choice of ordering
quantity will converge to one of the intersections shown in the graphs. Figure 10 through
Figure 13 demonstrate the convergence process to the equilibrium point by way of the
graphs of the retailers’ response functions.
by retailer 1 and

indicates an action (order quantity) chosen

indicates an action chosen by retailer 2.

As seen in Figure 10, if retailer 1 were to choose a (non-equilibrium) quantity of
, then the figure shows how retailer 2’s response would be a (non-equilibrium)
quantity of (approximately) 135. Figure 11 subsequently demonstrates how retailer 1
would respond to the retailer 2’s choice of 135, with a (non-equilibrium) quantity of
(approximately) 109. As this is still not an equilibrium quantity, retailer 2 would respond
with a quantity of approximately 120 (as seen in Figure 12). The evolution of this
conceptual adjustment process continues in Figure 13, as the choices converge on the
equilibrium point A, where the two response functions cross. In this example, because of
the symmetry of the response functions,

at the equilibrium point.
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Figure 10: Retailer 2's response to retailer 1's choice of an ordering quantity of 70.

Figure 11: Retailer 1's response to retailer 2's choice of an ordering quantity of 135.
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Figure 12: Retailer 2's response to retailer 1's choice of an ordering quantity of 109.
The quantities are converging to Intersection A.

Figure 13: Retailer 1's response to retailer 2's choice of ordering quantity of 120.
Nearly converged on Intersection A.
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When appropriate cost conditions are in place, there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium for the combination of response functions for two retailers for the situation
considered in (Rudi, 2001).

The conditions for the existence of a unique Nash

equilibrium are given by (Fudenberg, 1991) and are also discussed in (Rudi, 2001). In
order to establish the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium, it must be shown that the
response functions are monotonic and that the absolute value of the slope of the response
function is less than one.
In (Sosic, 2006) a myopic and farsighted stability is examined in a transshipment
model using the framework of cooperative game theory. This is different than the
previous research discussed in this chapter because a cooperative game is being examined
rather than a non-cooperative game. A myopic framework assumes that the retailers only
look at the immediate consequences to their actions whereas in a farsighted framework
the retailers look at the potential subsequent reactions that may occur as a result of their
actions and the resulting changes in profit allocations. It is concluded that a grand
coalition (grouping that includes all retailers) is the only coalition structure that is stable
under all possible relationships between unsold inventories and unsatisfied demands
when using a farsighted framework.
In (Anupindi, 2001) a “coopetitive” framework is developed in order to address
the sequential inventory and allocation decisions. In the “coopetitive” framework each
retailer first determines their inventory and then demand is satisfied. Next the retailers
cooperate by sharing the remaining inventories to satisfy unmet demand and allocate the
profit generated from the inventory sharing. In (Granot, 2003) a similar framework is
used that includes an additional non-cooperative stage where each retailer determines the
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amount of residuals that they want to share with the other retailers. The work in (Sosic,
2006) is based on the model from (Granot, 2003).
(Slikker 2005) examines a scenario with n retailers, where each is facing a
newsvendor problem. The research presented is focused on determining if groups of
transshipping retailers can improve their expected joint profit by coordinating their orders
and whether or not the retailers should participate in transshipping. The situation is
analyzed by defining a cooperative game, called a general news-vendor game. It is found
that the general news-vendor games have non-empty cores. A non-empty core means
that no group of players (retailers) has an incentive to not cooperate.
The model described in this dissertation varies from the cooperative game models
in that the retailers are competitively driven when making inventory decisions, taking
into consideration the other retailer’s inventory decisions.

In the cooperative game

models an explicit agreement is required to manage the joint profits among the players.
In the non-cooperative model studied here, the supplier’s quantity discount decisions lead
to equal expected profits for the retailers in equilibrium without an explicit profit-sharing
agreement. Additionally, this work establishes results for the two-block tariff quantity
discount structure. To our knowledge, no other work based on the cooperative game
model has existing results for this quantity discount structure.
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Chapter 3: Transshipment Game with Two Retailers and Quantity
Discounts
This chapter first develops the model for a decentralized two retailer
transshipment game based on the classic newsvendor model. Quantity discounts are then
introduced to this model for a transshipment game with two retailers. The expected cost
function is developed, and the optimal actions of the retailers are described through the
development of the response functions, based on derivatives of the costs for the retailers.
Sample graphs are given demonstrating the existence of equilibrium points as a function
of the discount schedule offered by the supplier to the retailers. Additionally, expressions
for the profits from both a retailer’s perspective and a supplier’s perspective are
developed. Studying the potential equilibrium points and how they relate to profit leads
to new ways of viewing the influence of the supplier in guiding the behavior of the
retailers through the supplier’s choice of the discount schedule.

3.1:

The Model

The basis for the model is the newsvendor model where inventory is purchased at
the beginning of each time period, can be salvaged at the end of each time period, and
can no longer be sold during the following time periods. The expected profit in the
newsvendor model is defined as the following:
(1)
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where πn is the expected profit for the newsvendor which is represented by the superscript
n. The decision-maker in the newsvendor orders with information about the distribution
of demand, but without knowing its realized value. The demand that the newsvendor
faces in each time period and the quantity that the newsvendor has ordered in each time
period are represented by D and Q respectively. The cost per unit of inventory that the
newsvendor purchases from the supplier is represented by c, where c is constant cost for
all units purchased and c > 0. The revenue to the newsvendor per unit sold is represented
by r, where r > c. If the newsvendor has excess inventory at the end of a time period it
can be salvaged for a value of s, where s < c. If the newsvendor fails to meet demand
(i.e. D > Q), a penalty cost p is paid per each unit of demand not met where

.

Taking the derivative of Equation 1 with respect to Q results in the marginal profitability
of Q:
(2)
Assuming that the cumulative demand distribution is continuous and strictly increasing, a
unique order quantity

exists such that the newsvendor’s profit is at a maximum.

Setting Equation 2 equal to zero and rearranging results in the following:
(3)
where

is the profit-maximizing order quantity.
The retailer model (similar to that in (Rudi, 2001)) is based on the newsvendor,

but expands on it by adding a second newsvendor to the model and allowing the two
newsvendors to transship inventory to each other. The two newsvendors face separate
and independent demands and still can salvage excess inventory and incur penalty costs
as in the newsvendor model.

The transshipment allows for a newsvendor’s unmet
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demand to be met by the other newsvendor’s excess inventory, where the ordering
quantity is determined by each newsvendor. The expected profit at location i is:
(4)
where subscript j indicates the competing retailer (also a newsvendor). πid represents the
expected profit at location i in a decentralized newsvendor transshipment system. The
price charged by retailer i for each unit transshipped to retailer j is represented by cij,
likewise, the price charged by retailer j for each unit transshipped to retailer i is
represented by cji. The costs associated with shipping each unit from retailer i to retailer j
is represented by τij, and is incurred by retailer i.

The amount of inventory to be

transshipped from retailer i to retailer j is represented as Tij, and is defined as:
(5)
Retail sales for retailer i are defined as:
(6)
Unsold stock for retailer i is defined as:
(7)
And unmet demand for retailer i is defined as:
(8)
A few assumptions are necessary to ensure that transshipments occur naturally.
In order to ensure that it is profitable to send a transshipment, the transshipment price
must be greater than the salvage value plus the cost of sending the unit to the other
retailer

. In order to ensure that it is profitable to receive transshipments,

the transshipment price must be less than the marginal value of an additional sale
. Additionally, it is assumed that the two retailers are symmetric in cost
43

structure so that it is not beneficial to always purchase the inventory for both retailers
through one retailer and then transship to the other retailer.
The possible transshipment events are defined in Table 1:

Event

Description

Pr{Event}

Transshipments

Table 1: Events Table

A graphical representation of the transshipment events for the transshipment model is
shown in Figure 14.
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Figure 14: Graphical Illustration of Events in transshipment model

The pure transshipment model is extended here to include a quantity discount
based on a two-block tariff from the supplier to the retailer. The quantity above which
the discount is offered to the retailer is represented by x. In this discount model, the
normal price charged by the supplier to the retailers per unit is represented by cn and the
reduced price charged by the supplier to the retailers per unit over x is represented by cr,
where

. The expected profit for retailer i for the quantity discount newsvendor

transshipment model is represented by πiqd and is defined as:
(9)
where πid is:
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and πir is the expected profit where retailer i is ordering enough units to receive some
units at a discounted price from the supplier and is defined as:
.
(10)
In addition to the other assumptions assume that

. This assumption ensures that it

is not profitable for a retailer to purchase stock and salvage it for a profit. Using the
definitions in Equations 5, 6, 7, and 8 in Equation 10 results in the following:

(11)
Figure 15 shows the transshipment events that occur within the transshipment
with quantity discount model. Note that we explicitly allow that the quantity discounts
could lead to non symmetric order quantities, and this significantly affects the defined
event regions as compared to the graphical illustration of the model without quantity
discounts.
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Figure 15: Graphical illustration of the transshipment events that occur in the
transshipment with quantity discount model.

Rearranging the terms from Equation 11 and expanding out the expectation
operator results in the following:

47

(12)
Next we define:
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(13)
Differentiation of Equation 12 with respect to Qi results in the following equation:
(14)
A similar result is derived from πid when differentiation with respect to Qi is applied to
Equation 4, as shown in the following equation:
(15)
Equation 15 has the same structural form as Equation 9 from (Rudi, 2001). (Rudi, 2001)
studies this equation to show that the response functions are monotonic and that the
absolute value of the slope is less than one, thus proving that there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium for any pair of competing response curves.
Setting the derivatives in Equation 14 and Equation 15 equal to zero and solving
for

as a function of

and

as a function of
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results in the optimal ordering

quantities for each retailer

) as a function of the other retailer’s ordering quantity.

Thus Equation 16 and Equation 17 define the response functions for retailer i.
(16)
(17)
The optimal ordering quantity points that are common to both retailers’ response
functions define the equilibrium points for the two retailers’ ordering quantities. A major
difference between the model presented in this dissertation compared to the model in
(Rudi, 2001) is the possible existence of up to four potential equilibrium points
depending on the value of the quantity discount, x. These four potential equilibrium
points are a result of the “family” of two response functions, given by Equation 16 and
Equation 17, for each retailer. The combinations of the response functions, one for each
retailer, result in four possible intersections which are labeled A(
C1(

), and C2(

), B(

),

).

3.1.1: The Exponential Demand Distribution Case
A special case of the two retailer transshipment with quantity discounts problem
is the case where the exponential demand distribution is used. Unlike the other demand
distributions used in this dissertation, the characteristics of the exponential distribution
allow the expected retailer profit function, and subsequently the retailer response function
to be simplified. Equation 18 gives the retailer profit when buying according to the
reduced cost from the supplier and an exponential demand distribution is used,

.

Note that a similar equation can derived when using the normal cost from the supplier,
where the only difference is the cost from the supplier. The variable m is defined as one
divided by the mean of the exponential distribution.
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(18)
Compared to Equation 12, it is easy to see that this expression is much smaller in size and
the integration has been simplified. Equation 19 gives the response function for the
retailer when using the reduced cost from the supplier.

(19)
Like the expected profit equation, the expression for the response function for the
exponential case is much smaller in size then its general counterpart presented in
Equation 16.

3.2:

Supplier Profit

The expected supplier profit

, is given by Equation 20, where

is the

supplier’s production cost.

(20)
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3.3:

Results

3.3.1: Analysis of Potential Equilibrium
By differentiating the profit model without a quantity discount for a single retailer
with respect to that retailer’s ordering quantity
order quantity of the first retailer
retailer

, we get an equation that describes the

as a function of the ordering quantity of the second

. Note that the notation is switching from the more generalized notation (i and

j) to a more specific notation (1 and 2). Using Equation 12 to graph
and also graphing

as a function of

as a function of

, we obtain the graph shown in Figure 16.

The parameters for this figure are based on: cij = cji = 26; cn = 20; cr = 13; ri = 40; si = 10;
pi = 0; τij = 2; Di , Dj ~ Normal (mean =100, st. dev. = 50). Additionally, x is very large
in this figure in order to prevent the retailers from receiving a quantity discount. Figure
16 is similar to Figure 2 from (Rudi, 2001).

Figure 16: Equilibrium point A for a two retailer transshipment model without
quantity discount.
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Note that retailer 1 and retailer 2 are symmetric in their associated costs in this example.
Because of this the graph of the response function for each retailer is a reflection of the
other retailer’s response function along the line

. The intersection made by the

two lines at point A represents a potential equilibrium. In a Nash equilibrium each
retailer will keep their order quantities unchanged given the knowledge of the other
retailers order quantity. Additionally, note that in the model in (Rudi 2001) when the two
retailers are symmetric in their costs, the point at which the Nash equilibrium occurs will
be a symmetric point where

.

Unlike in Figure 16, when the quantity discount is taken into account, each
retailer has an overall response function that comes about through the composition of two
curves based on Equation 16 and Equation 17. The two curves do not intersect each
other and are formed individually, one for each cost per unit (cn and cr, below and above
the discount quantity, respectively). Figure 17 shows the two curves for one of the
retailers.

When a quantity discount exists the overall response function has a

discontinuity at the discount triggering quantity of the quantity discount. Figure 18
shows the overall response function for a single retailer with the discontinuity created by
the quantity discount.
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Figure 17: Two curves that determine the response function for a single retailer.

Figure 18: Overall response functions for a single retailer with discontinuity from
quantity discount at a quantity of x = 140
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Plotting both sets of response functions simultaneously (response of
the response of

to

to

and

) in a model that allows for a quantity discount from the supplier

is shown in Figure 19.

Figure 19: Plot of intersecting response functions showing the existence of four
equilibrium points for two retailers with a quantity discount at x = 140.

Notice that there are now four potential Nash equilibrium points where as without the
quantity discount there exists just a single Nash equilibrium.

Two of the four

intersections, Intersection A and Intersection B are symmetric (

and

) and occur on the line

. The other two intersections, Intersection C1 and

Intersection C2 are not symmetric and do not lie on the line
Intersection C1 is equal to the value of
and

. The value of

in

in Intersection C2 and vice versa, that is

. The existence of the four intersections depends on the

value of the discount triggering quantity x. Figure 20 shows a graph of the response
functions of a transshipment model with quantity discount where x is a large value. Thus
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with large values of x, only Intersection A exists; this is because the discount triggering
quantity is too large for the retailers to take advantage of. When x decreases to the point
at which x is equal to or less than the value of

in Intersection C1 and

in

Intersection C2, as shown in Figure 21, the existence of Intersection C1 and Intersection
C2 are present.

Figure 20: Transshipment model with quantity discount where x is large.
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Figure 21: Transshipment model with quantity discount, x = 160. Intersections A,
C1, and C2 present.

As x continues to decrease, the existence of Intersection B as well as the other three
intersections are present (Figure 19). Intersection B exists at the point at which x is equal
to the value of
the value of

and
and

from Intersection B. Once the value of x has decreased below
from Intersection A, Intersection A no longer exists as shown in

Figure 22.
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Figure 22: Transshipment model with quantity discount, x = 110.

The last change in existence of the intersections occurs when the value of x decreases to a
value below the value of

in Intersection C1 and

in Intersection C2, at which the

intersections C1 and C2 no longer exist as shown in Figure 23. The only existing
intersection is now Intersection B.

58

Figure 23: Transshipment model with quantity discount, x = 90.

The existence of the four intersections is summarized in Table 2

Table 2: Existence of the Intersections as a function of x

The four intersections give the four ordering quantity combinations for

and

that result in a potential Nash equilibrium.

Proposition 1: A unique intersection exists for any pairing of response functions in
Equation 16 and Equation 17, one for each retailer.
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Brief Proof: For the symmetric cases the existence of a unique intersection for each
pairing of the response functions in (16) and (17) (one for each retailer) is guaranteed
when the response functions are monotonic and that the absolute value of the slope is less
than 1 ((Fudenberg, 1991), (Rudi, 2001). Through implicit differentiation of the response
functions in Equations (16) or (17) (Similar to (Rudi, 2001)) the slope of these response
function is known to be nonpositive with an absolute value less than 1. The constants in
the right hand sides in (16) and (17) (

and

) differentiate these response functions

from each other. These constants do not play a role in the slope of the response functions
through implicit differentiation of the response functions,

and

with respect to

.

For the non-symmetric cases (intersection of Equation (16) for one retailer with Equation
(17) for the other retailer) the different right hand side constants do not change the
property that the response functions must intersect. ■
3.3.2: Analysis of Retailer Profit
Figure 24 shows the optimal profit for the retailers with differing values of x,
which is given by Equation 12. The different lines represent the different ordering
quantity combinations that result in a potential Nash equilibrium.

These possible

ordering quantity combinations are defined by the intersections shown in Figure 19. The
lines forming the intersections are a result of the following parameters: cij = cji = 26, cn =
20, cr = 13, ri = 40, si = 10, pi = 0, τij = 2, Di, Dj ~ Normal (mean = 100, st. dev. = 50).
The Normal distribution was truncated so that negative values were eliminated and the
remaining probability distributed proportionately over the positive demand values.
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Figure 24: Retailer Profit for different values of x, comparing different ordering
quantity combinations.

Note that the slope of the lines representing the retailer profit at Equilibrium A and the
smaller ordering quantity at either Equilibrium C1 or Equilibrium C2 in Figure 24 will
always be zero due to the fact that the ordering quantities for the retailers while at these
equilibria is always less than the value of x. Similarly, the slope of the lines representing
the retailer profit at Equilibrium B and the larger ordering quantity at either Equilibrium
C1 or Equilibrium C2 in Figure 24 will always be equal to cr – cn due to the fact that the
ordering quantities for the retailers at these equilibria is greater than the value of x and
thus the profit is affected as x changes, which can be seen from Equation 12.
In order to determine the point at which the line representing the smaller Q at
Equilibrium C1 or C2 and the line representing the larger Q at Equilibrium C1 or C2
cross, a version of Equation 12 for each retailer i is set equal to a version of Equation 12
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for retailer j. Rearranging the equation results in Equation 21, which describes the value
of x where the profits for both retailers at Equilibrium C1 or C2 are equal.

(21)

62

Evaluating Equation 21 using the same values for the variables as used in the example
above results in x ≈ 148, which represents the value of x at which the profits for both
retailers at Intersection C1 or C2 are equal.
In general, we can state Proposition 1, clarifying the existence of the nonsymmetric C equilibrium, followed by a brief conceptual proof:

Proposition 2: If

is large enough, then there exists an

that leads to a C

equilibrium.

Proof: At either C1 or C2, the profit for the retailer with the larger ordering quantity (the
retailer that optimally orders above the quantity discount) is linearly decreasing in x, with
slope -(

). Note that the ordering quantities at C1 and C2 do not vary with x. The

profit for the retailer with the lower profit at C1 or C2 is constant in x (because that
retailer’s order quantity is below x). If

is large enough, then there is scope for

enough variation in x (if the range of x where C1 and C2 exist is wide enough), for the
profit of the retailer with the larger order to drop to below the profit for the retailer with
the smaller order. The range of existence for C1 and C2 is a function of the distance
between the response functions, which is a direct function of
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3.3.3: Analysis of Supplier Profit
Supplier profit is given by Equation 20 and depends on x as well as the ordering
quantities of the retailers. Figure 25 shows the supplier’s profit dependent upon x.
profit
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Figure 25: Supplier Profit for various values of x.

Note that it can be seen from Equation 12 that the cost is proportional to the value of x,
thus the slope of the supplier profit in the low range for x (Equilibrium B) in Figure 25
will always be equal to 2(cn – cr) due to the fact that the ordering quantities for both of
the retailers at the equilibrium is greater than the value of x and thus the supplier profit is
affected accordingly.

The slope of the supplier profit in the middle range of x

(Equilibrium C1 or C2) will always be cn – cr due to the ordering quantity for one of the
retailers at the equilibria is greater than the value of x while the ordering quantity for the
other retailer is below x.

The slope of the supplier profit in the high range of x

(Equilibrium A) will always be zero due to the ordering quantities for both retailers being
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less than the value of x and thus there is no change in profit for the supplier for changes
in x while at this equilibrium.
Comparing Figure 24 to Figure 25 exposes some important aspects of the model.
A point of interest on the graphs is the far left,

which appears to be the best point

for the retailers while being the worst point for the supplier. Similarly, the right end of
the Equilibrium B supplier profit line appears to be the best point for the supplier while
being the worst point for the retailers.
3.3.4: Determining Stability
Determining the recommended ordering quantities requires defining “stable”
points or regions for the quantity discount value within the transshipment and quantity
discount model. A stable region is defined as a region, distinguished by the discount
triggering quantity, where
1. the expected profit for retailer i is equal to the expected profit for retailer j and
2. the two retailers are at an equilibrium that has a larger expected profit for both
retailers than any other equilibrium that is in existence for a particular value of
x.
We define stable in this way because
1. when the two retailers have equal profit they will not “jockey” for the role in
the non-symmetric equilibrium with higher profit.
2. when the two retailers have no other potential equilibrium to switch to that has
a higher profit, they will choose the stable equilibrium point.
Using this definition, we can determine the stable regions for the system as shown in
Table 3.

65

Retailer's Choice
X

Choice

Supplier's Profit Trend

B

Increasing as x increases

Unstable

Unstable

C

-

Unstable

Unstable

A

Constant as x increases

Table 3: Retailer's choice defined by stable and unstable regions of x

Using the values from our example results in Table 4.
Retailer's Choice
X

Choice

Supplier's Profit Trend

B

Increasing as x increases

Unstable

Unstable

C

-

Unstable

Unstable

A

Constant as x increases

Table 4: Stable and unstable regions of x

Additionally, Table 4 shows the choice that the retailers will make within each region and
the supplier’s profit trend within those regions.

Here, a retailer will choose the

equilibrium point that has the highest expected profit for the retailer. Knowing the
retailer’s choices within each region allows the supplier to set the best values for the
quantity discount. An analysis of the stable retailer’s choice for ordering quantities as
relates to the supplier is shown in Table 5.
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x
101.261
147.719
176.75-Infinity

Total Quantity Sold
311.6
278
238.7

Supplier Profit
2352.7
2576.9
2387.1

Retailer 1 Profit Retailer 2 Profit
1874.5
1874.5
1702.6
1702.6
1675.1
1675.1

Table 5: Supplier's choice for the value of the quantity discount

As you can see from Table 5 the supplier’s profit is highest at the point described by
Equation 21, which is the only stable point that occurs in the region where equilibria C1
and C2 exist. This stable point occurs when the retailers are at either equilibrium C1 or
C2. The existence of this stable point is dependent upon one of the following two
conditions:
(22)
(23)
If either Equation 22 or 23 is true then the non-symmetric stable point exists.
3.3.5: Comparison of Models
Table 6 shows example results for the ordering quantities and profits for the three
different models: newsvendor, transshipment, and transshipment with quantity discount.
Ordering Quantity

Profit

Quantity Retailer Retailer
Transshipment Discount

1

2

Retailer Retailer
Total Supplier

1

2

Total

No

No

122.6

122.6

245.2

2451.7

1529.9

1529.9

5511.5

Yes

No

119.4

119.4

238.7

2387.1

1675.1

1675.1

5737.3

Yes

Yes

101.3

176.7

278

2576.9

1702.6

1702.6

5982.1

Table 6: Example comparison of different models

Similarly to Table 6, Table 7 shows the percentage of change in results from the
newsvendor model.
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Ordering Quantity

Profit

Quantity Retailer Retailer
Transshipment Discount

Retailer Retailer

1

2

Total

Supplier

1

2

Total

No

No

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Yes

No

-2.6%

-2.6%

-2.7%

-2.6%

9.5%

9.5%

4.1%

Yes

Yes

-17.4%

44.1%

13.4%

5.1%

11.3%

11.3%

8.5%

Table 7: Percentage of change in results from the newsvendor model

From Table 6 and Table 7 we can draw the conclusion that the transshipment with
quantity discounts model is more profitable for both the supplier and the two retailers in
comparison to the transshipment model and the newsvendor model. The transshipment
model increases retailer profit at the expense of decreasing the supplier profit. The
transshipment model with quantity discounts results in increased supplier and retailer
profits when compared to either the transshipment model or the newsvendor model. The
total ordering quantity of the transshipment model is decreased when compared to the
newsvendor model; however, the total ordering in the transshipment with quantity
discount model is increased when compared to the other two models.
3.3.6: Parametric Analysis
Some results from the transshipment with quantity discount model with
varying input parameters are given in Table 9. Table 8 shows the input parameters for
the results shown in Table 9. Note that some of the cases do not result in a stable C
equilibrium because they do not meet the conditions described in Equation 22 and
Equation 23.
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Variables
s

τ

p

13

10

2

5

10

20

13

10

2

30

10

26

20

19

10

2

5

10

40

26

20

19

10

2

30

10

Uniform(100, 300)

40

26

20

13

10

2

5

10

6

Uniform(100, 300)

40

26

20

13

10

2

30

10

7

Uniform(100, 300)

40

26

20

19

10

2

5

10

8

Uniform(100, 300)

40

26

20

19

10

2

30

10

Case

Distribution

r

1

Normal(200, 50)

40

26

20

2

Normal(200, 50)

40

26

3

Normal(200, 50)

40

4

Normal(200, 50)

5

Table 8: Input parameters for transshipment with quantity discount model
examples

Case
1
1
1

Q1
Q2
221.001 221.001 279.254
260.668 260.668 206.002
206.002 279.254 252.68

Supplier
Profit
4420.02
4448.04
4666.54

Retailer 1
Profit
3944.86
4153.8
3976.37

Retailer 2
Profit
3944.86
4153.8
3976.37

2
2
2

216.109 216.109 269.832
261.331 261.331 214.029
214.029 269.832 256.45

4322.18
4564.39
4744.94

3741.07
4081.51
3883.48

3741.07
4081.51
3883.48

3
3
3

221.001 221.001 226.878
225.144 225.144 219.31
219.31 226.878 235.468

4420.02
4491.21

3944.86
3950.82
No Stable C point

3944.86
3950.82

4
4
4

216.109 216.109 221.513
221.845 221.845 216.66
216.66 221.513 247.637

4322.18
4426.53

3741.07
3798.91
No Stable C point

3741.07
3798.91

5
5
5

222.662 222.662 286.233
269.778 269.778 205.553
205.553 286.233 267.956

4453.24
4496.41
4789.02

3489.06
3732.05
3495.15

3489.06
3732.05
3495.15
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6
6
6

208.794 208.794 271.853
266.94 266.94 214.725
214.725 271.853 277.696

4175.88
4607.79

3137.06
3655.71
No Stable C point

3137.06
3655.71

7
7
7

222.662 222.662 231.122
228.378 228.378 219.925
219.925 231.122 251.988

4453.24
4550.65

3489.06
3496.95
No Stable C point

3489.06
3496.95

8
8
8

208.794 208.794 215.945
216.098 216.098 209.078
209.078 215.945 276.294

4175.88
4307.92

3137.06
3239.9
No Stable C point

3137.06
3239.9

Table 9: Transshipment with quantity discount model example results. For each
case, the first line is the pure newsvendor, the second line is the newsvendor with
transshipment, and the third line is the newsvendor with transshipment and a
quantity discount.

Notice from Table 8 and Table 9 that changing the quantity discount costs significantly
affects the existence of the C equilibrium. Further examining of this event is shown in
Table 10 and Table 11.

In Table 10, cr is varied and in Table 11 cn is varied

demonstrating that the C equilibrium does not always exist for small differences between
cn and cr. Once the difference between cn and cr is large enough for the C equilibrium to
exist, it will remain in existence for all larger differences between cn and cr that are valid
inputs for the model.
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Q1

Supplier

Retailer

Retailer

Total

Q2

Profit

1 Profit

2 Profit

Profit

Case

cr

1 and 3

11

196.049 334.375 264.932

4679.25

4028.88

4028.88

12737.01

1 and 3

12

202.011

297.93

257.515

4676.09

3998.11

3998.11

12672.31

1 and 3

13

206.002 279.254

252.68

4666.54

3976.37

3976.37

12619.28

1 and 3

14

209.045 266.256 248.897

4648.86

3961.21

3961.21

12571.28

1 and 3

15

211.559

245.682

4624.2

3950.84

3950.84

12525.88

1 and 3

16

213.747 247.457 242.822

4593.5

3944.22

3944.22

12481.94

1 and 3

17

215.725 239.933 240.208

No Stable C Point

1 and 3

18

217.563 233.142 237.772

No Stable C Point

1 and 3

19

219.31

No Stable C Point

256.04

226.878 235.468

Table 10: Cases 1 and 3 results shown with varying values of cr. cn = 20

Supplier

Retailer

Retailer

Total

Profit

1 Profit

2 Profit

Profit

Case

cn

Q1

Q2

1 and 3

12

269.302

298.88

1 and 3

13

254.531 302.434 291.291

1560.45

5579.41

5579.41

12719.27

1 and 3

14

243.37 306.117 285.352

2135.65

5330.32

5330.32

12796.29

1 and 3

15

233.99

310.008 280.533

2602.09

5091.91

5091.91

12785.91

1 and 3

16

225.629 314.163 276.462

3050.25

4862.86

4862.86

12775.97

1 and 3

17

217.881

272.952

3481.51

4642.37

4642.37

12766.25

1 and 3

18

210.488 323.455 269.893

3896.61

4430.01

4430.01

12756.63

1 and 3

19

203.263 328.685 267.228

4295.88

4225.53

4225.53

12746.94

1 and 3

20

196.049 334.375 264.932

4679.25

4028.88

4028.88

12737.01

1 and 3

21

188.696 340.593 263.008

5046.33

3840.13

3840.13

12726.59

1 and 3

22

181.033 347.435 261.493

5396.25

3659.53

3659.53

12715.31

1 and 3

23

172.841 355.057 260.466

5727.58

3487.59

3487.59

12702.76

318.63

299.187

No Stable C Point

Table 11: Cases 1 and 3 results shown with varying values of cn. cr = 11

Figure 26 and Figure 27 show a graphical representation of the data given in Table 10.
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Figure 26: Q1, Q2, and
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Figure 27: Retailer and Supplier profits for cases 1 and 3 as cr changes, cn= 20

Figure 28 and Figure 29 show a graphical representation of the data given in Table 11.
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Figure 29: Retailer and Supplier profits for cases 1 and 3 as cn changes, cr= 11

In Table 10, as well as in Figure 27, we see that the supplier’s profit, in addition
to each retailer’s profit and subsequently the total profit, increases as cr decreases until
the value of cr is less than s, making the parameters invalid for the model. As seen in
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Figure 26, no stable C point exists when cr approaches the value of cn, which in this case
is the range of cr = 17 through cr = 19.
Additionally, Table 11 and Figure 29 show that the supplier’s profit increases as
cn is increased. No stable C point exists for small differences between cn and cr, which in
this case is when cn = 12, which can be seen in Figure 28. From these results it appears
that in order to receive the maximum profit, the supplier should set cr to the lowest
feasible value and set cn to the highest feasible value while staying within the model
limits, including

. These results help support the practical validity of the conditions

from Proposition 2, which requires that the difference between cn and cr be larger, in
order to ensure the existence of the C1 and C2 equilibria.
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Chapter 4: Three Retailer Transshipment with a Central Retailer
Another possible point of interest is the scenario involving a third retailer where
one retailer can transship with the other two retailers; however, the other two retailers
cannot transship with each other. Figure 30 shows a flow diagram of the transshipment
in the described system.

Figure 30: Flow Diagram of Proposed Scenario

This system is used in determining the value to each entity in the system from the
previous chapter of one retailer adding an additional transshipment partner. In Chapter 3
it is shown that quantity discount pricing to the retailers from the supplier in addition to a
transshipment agreement between the two retailers increases profit for both retailers and
the supplier when compared to the newsvendor solution and the transshipment without
quantity discount systems. This chapter builds an appropriate model representing the
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system described by Figure 30 and examines the retailer and supplier profits for
comparison with the two retailer transshipment model with quantity discounts.

4.1:

The Model

Section 4.1 encompasses many subsections that describe the three retailer
transshipment with a central retailer model.

Subsection 4.1.1 defines the essential

notation used in this chapter. Subsection 4.1.2 defines the transshipment logic used for
determining how transshipments are carried out within the transshipment system.
Subsection 4.1.3 gives the model that is used as a basis for the three retailer
transshipment model. In Subsection 4.1.4 the expected central retailer profit function is
derived. In Subsection 4.1.5 the expected non-central retailer profit function is derived.
Subsection 4.1.6 presents the transshipment event graphs associated with the three
retailer transshipment model. In Subsection 4.1.7 the central retailer response function is
defined. Finally, in Subsection 4.1.8 the non-central retailer response function is defined.
4.1.1: Essential Notation
In this subsection the essential notation used in the three retailer transshipment
system is described. Let the subscript c be used to represent the central retailer in the
three retailer system described here and let the subscript nc,i and nc,j be used to represent
the two non-central retailers. Let D denote the customer demand, such that the demand
for the central retailer is represented by
represented by

and

and the demand for the non-central retailers is

. Similarly, let Q denote the ordering quantity, such that

the ordering quantity for the central retailer is represented by
for the non-central retailers is represented by
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and

and the ordering quantity
.

The amount transshipped from one retailer to another is denoted by T and uses the
subscripts c and i to denote the direction of the transshipment. The first subscript
represents the retailer sending the transshipment and the second subscript represents the
retailer receiving the transshipment. Thus,

represents the amount transshipped from

one of the non-central retailers, i to the central retailer, c. Likewise,

represents the

amount transshipped from the central retailer, c, to a non-central retailer, i.
4.1.2: Transshipment Logic
In order to define the expected profit for each of the three retailers, transshipment
rules must first be defined. The transshipment rules are divided into two categories, the
first of which defines the transshipment rules when the central retailer has excess
inventory while the second defines the transshipment rules when the central retailer has
excess demand. In this system we assume the following rules for transshipment when the
central retailer has excess inventory :
1

Initial Allocation of Excess Central Inventory: If the central retailer has
excess inventory available after satisfying local demand and both noncentral retailers have excess demand, the excess inventory of the central
retailer is initially divided evenly and allocated for potential transshipment
to each of the two non-central retailers. If the central retailer has excess
inventory available after satisfying local demand and only one non-central
retailer has excess demand, then all of the excess inventory from the
central retailer is allocated to the non-central retailer with excess demand.

2

Final Reconciliation of Excess Central Inventory: Based on the Initial
Allocation of Excess Central Inventory, if the excess demand at one of the
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non-central retailers is more than the amount initially allocated to them
(the “short retailer”) while the excess demand at the other retailer is less
the amount initially allocated to them (the “satisfied retailer”), then the
excess inventory allocated for the satisfied retailer will be used to meet the
demand at the short retailer.
Note that if the central retailer has excess inventory and both non-central retailers have no
excess demand then transshipment does not occur.
We assume the following rules for transshipment when the central retailer has
excess demand:

1

Initial Offering of Excess Central Demand: When the central retailer has
excess demand after using local stock to satisfy local demand, it will
accept (an) incoming transshipment(s). This excess demand of the central
retailer is initially divided evenly and an equal amount is offered to each
of the two non-central retailers for fulfillment. If the central retailer has
excess demand available after satisfying local demand and only one noncentral retailer has excess inventory, then all of the excess demand from
the central retailer is allocated to be fulfilled by the non-central retailer
with excess inventory.

2

Final Reconciliation of Excess Central Demand: When the central retailer
has excess demand, if one of the non-central retailer’s excess stock
exceeds the demand initially offered to them (the “overstocked retailer”)
while the excess stock at the other non-central retailer is less than the
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amount initially offered to them (the “stocked out retailer”), then the
excess demand offered to the stocked out retailer will be offered to the
overstocked retailer for fulfillment.
Note that if the central retailer has excess demand and both non-central retailers have no
excess inventory then transshipment does not occur.
4.1.3: Model Origins
The basis for this model is the two retailer version of the transshipment with
quantity discounts that is described in Equation 9, Equation 4, and Equation 10; where
is the expected retailer profit for each retailer.
(9)
(4)
.
(10)
4.1.4: Expected Central Retailer Profit
Let the subscript c be used to represent the central retailer in the three retailer system
described here and let the subscript nc,i and nc,j be used to represent the two non-central
retailers. Let

represent the expected profit for the central retailer in the three retailer

system. The expected profit for the central retailer is given in Equation 24.
(24)
Where

is the ordering quantity of the central retailer,
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is defined as:

(25)
and

are the ordering quantities of the two non-central retailers, and

is

defined as:

(26)
The amount of inventory to be transshipped from a non-central retailer, retailer i, to the
central retailer, retailer c, is represented as Tic, and is defined as:

(27)
The amount of inventory to be transshipped from the central retailer, retailer c to a noncentral retailer, retailer i, is represented as Tci, and is defined as:

(28)
Retail sales for retailer c are defined as:
(29)
Unsold stock for retailer c is defined as:
(30)
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And unmet demand for retailer c is defined as:
(31)
Combining Equations 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31 with Equation 26 results in the
expanded version of

, which is given in Appendix A. Similarly, those equations can be

combined with Equation 25 to get the expanded version of

, the only difference being

the cost per unit from the supplier. The expanded version of

can also be found in

Appendix A
Expanding out the expectation operator and rearranging the terms results in the
integral form of

, which is given in Appendix B. The integral form of

is similar to

, the only difference being the cost per unit from the supplier. The integral form of
can also be found in Appendix B.
4.1.5: Expected Non-Central Retailer Profit
Let

represent the expected profit for one of the two non-central retailers.
(32)

is defined as:

(33)
and

is defined as:

(34)
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Retail sales for retailer i are defined as:
(35)
Unsold stock for retailer c is defined as:
(36)
And unmet demand for retailer c is defined as:
(37)
Combining Equations 27, 28, 35, 36, and 37 with Equation 34 results in the
expanded version of

, which is given in Appendix C. Similarly, those equations can

be combined with Equation 33 to get the expanded version of

, the only difference

being the cost per unit from the supplier. The expanded version of

can also be

found in Appendix C.
Expanding out the expectation operator and rearranging the terms results in the
integral form of

, which is given in Appendix D. The integral form of

is similar

to

, the only difference being the cost per unit from the supplier. The integral form

of

can also be found in Appendix D.
4.1.6: Event Diagrams
Unlike the two retailer transshipment scenario, which can be described by events

in a two dimensional demand space, the three retailer scenario produces transshipment
events that must consider a three dimensional demand space. The simplest regions within
the three retailer transshipment event space are the zero transshipment areas, which are
shown in Figure 31 and Figure 32. The upper region in Figure 31 represents the area
where the demand for each retailer is larger than that retailer’s ordering quantity. The
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lower region in Figure 31 represents the area where the demand for each retailer is
smaller than that retailer’s ordering quantity. In both regions, no transshipments occur.

Figure 31: Zero transshipment areas of the three retailer transshipment with
quantity discounts case event graph.

83

Figure 32: Zero transshipment areas of the three retailer transshipment with
quantity discounts case event graph.

The diagram representing regions of demand where transshipment from retailer 1 to
retailer 2 occurs is shown in Figure 33.
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Figure 33: Regions representing the transshipment from retailer 1 to retailer 2 of
the three retailer transshipment with quantity discounts case event graph

Note that all of the transshipment events occur while the demand for retailer 1 is low
while the demand for retailer 2 is high. The transshipment events here occur close to the
d1 = 0 axis and no transshipments occur once the demand for retailer 1 is higher than
retailer 1’s ordering quantity. The demand for retailer 2 must also be higher than retailer
2’s ordering quantity for these transshipment events to occur. A similar diagram can be
generated for retailer 3’s transshipment to retailer 2.

The event diagram for

transshipment from retailer 3 to retailer 2 is shown in Figure 34.
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Figure 34: Regions representing the transshipment from retailer 3 to retailer 2 of
the three retailer transshipment with quantity discounts case event graph

Note that there is overlap in the transshipment events shown in Figure 33 and Figure 34
near the d2 axis (where d1 = d3 = 0). This is because in this region, both retailers
transship to retailer 2. The overlapping volume is comprised of several regions, where
each region represents a different amount of inventory transshipped to retailer 2 from
retailer 1 and from retailer 3 that is based upon the transshipment rules described in
Section 4.1.2. Similar event diagrams represent the transshipment from retailer 2 to
retailers 1 and 3. Figure 35 shows the transshipment events when retailer 2 transships to
retailer 1.
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Figure 35: Regions representing the transshipment from retailer 2 to retailer 1 of
the three retailer transshipment with quantity discounts case event graph

Note that transshipments from retailer 2 to retailer 1 only occur when there is an excess
of inventory for retailer 2 while there is an excess in demand for retailer 1. This can be
seen in Figure 35 where the transshipment events occur for low values of demand for
retailer 2 and higher values of demand for retailer 1. Similarly, Figure 36 shows the
transshipment events when retailer 2 transships to retailer 3.
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Figure 36: Regions representing the transshipment from retailer 2 to retailer 3 of
the three retailer transshipment with quantity discounts case event graph

Note that Figure 35 and Figure 36 share some overlapping regions where transshipments
occur from retailer 2 to both retailer 1 and retailer 3. A further explanation of the
transshipment event diagram can be found in Appendix E.
The construction of the event diagrams not only gives a graphical depiction of the
transshipment events, but also helped in verifying the derivation of the profit function
used in this scenario. Additionally, as an additional verification, the probability density
functions (pdfs) of demand were integrated numerically in the three dimensions over the
different regions of the event diagrams shown here.
integrals were shown to sum to one.

As they must, these sums of

Thus, this verifies that all possible demand
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realizations in the demand space are accounted for in the event diagrams. It also helped
verify the integral formulations (in particular the limits of integration) used in the profit
functions. The formula showing the summation of the pdfs to one can be found in
Appendix F.
4.1.7: Central Retailer Response Function
Next we define
Differentiation of

, which is given in Appendix G.

with respect to

results in the following equation:
(38)

A similar result is derived from

when differentiation with respect to

is applied as

shown in the following equation:
(39)
Setting the derivatives in Equation 38 and Equation 39 equal to zero and solving
for

as a function of

central retailer,

and

results in the optimal ordering quantity for the

, as a function of the other retailers’ ordering quantities.

Thus

Equation 40 and Equation 41 define the response functions for the central retailer.
(40)
(41)
4.1.8: Non-Central Retailer Response Function
Similarly, we define
Differentiation of

with respect to

, which is given in Appendix H.
results in the following equation:
(42)
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A similar result is derived from

when differentiation with respect to

is applied

as shown in the following equation:
(43)
Setting the derivatives in Equation 42 and Equation 43 equal to zero and solving
for

as a function of

and

; and

as a function of

the optimal ordering quantities for retailer i and retailer j
other retailers’ ordering quantities.

and

results in

) as a function of the

Thus Equation 44 and Equation 45 define the

response functions for retailer i.
(44)
(45)

4.2:

Expected Supplier Profit

The expected supplier profit

, is given by Equation 46, where

is the

supplier’s production cost.

(46)

4.3:

Results

The results section of the three retailer transshipment with quantity discounts case
first analyzes the response functions of the retailers. From the response functions, the
potential equilibria can be identified and from there the stable regions of the discount
triggering quantity can be identified. The expected profits of both the supplier and the
three retailers are calculated and examined with respect to varying costs from the
supplier. Lastly, a comparison is made between the three retailer case and the two
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retailer case such that conclusions can be made about the value added to the various
involved parties of introducing a third retailer into the transshipment system in
accordance to the method previously described in this chapter.
Unless otherwise stated, an exponential demand distribution is used in this section
for computational results in order to reduce the time needed for generating results. In
general the computational results can be obtained for any distribution function. In
general, the following parameters are used for generating graphs and making
comparisons:
;
and

;

;

;

;

~ Expo (mean = 200).

are varied and the values of which are later determined by the supplier based

upon expected supplier profit.
4.3.1: The Retailers’ Response Functions
The response functions for the three retailers can be viewed in a three dimensional
graph. In order to view the response functions of the three retailer transshipment with
quantity discount system in a two dimensional response graph, it is assumed that the
ordering quantities for the two non-central retailers are equal,
assumption that
the response function graph of

the response function graph of
and

. Due to the
and

is identical to

. Additionally, it is important to note that the

response curves for the central retailer and a non-central retailer are not mirror images of
each other, which was the case for the two retailers in the two retailer system. This is due
to the fact the central retailer can transship with both non-central retailers, while each
non-central retailer can only transship with the central retailer.
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In the two retailer scenario, changing

and

does not affect the existence of

the potential equilibria, other than if the difference between

and

is very small then

the C1 and C2 equilibria do not exist. However, in the three retailer scenario,

and

have more of an impact on the existence of the equilibria. Figure 37 shows a single set of
response curves when the cost per unit bought from the supplier is low.

Figure 37: Response curves for Qc and Qnc,i; cost from supplier of 13 per unit.

As the cost per unit bought from the supplier increases, inflection points develop in both
curves but at different rates. As the cost per unit bought from the supplier increases, the
inflection point can first be noticed in the response curve of the central retailer, then as
the cost per unit continues to increase, it is noticeable in the response curve of the non-
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central retailer. Figure 38 shows a single set of response curves when the cost per unit
bought from the supplier is higher.

Figure 38: Response curves for Qc and Qnc,i; cost from supplier of 23 per unit.

Through different combinations of the values for

and

, the existence of the

different equilibria can be controlled by the supplier. For larger differences between
and

, there exists only two equilibria, which are labeled as Equilibrium A and

Equilibrium B. The response functions using this combination of

and

can be seen

in Figure 39. As in the two retailer system, the intersection where both retailers are on
the response curve where the normal cost from the supplier is used is identified as
Equilibrium A, while the response curve where the reduced cost from the supplier is used
is identified as Equilibrium B.
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Figure 39: Response functions for Qc and Qnc,i, where cn=25 and cr=13.

It is possible to obtain a response function graph that resembles the response
function graph from the two retailer system. This occurs when the value of

is small

enough that the inflection points do not result in a second equilibrium between the
crossing of a normal cost response curve and reduced cost response curve.
combination of

and

A

resulting in this category of response function graph is given in

Figure 40. Equilibrium C1a and Equilibrium C2a represent equilibria that are a result of
the intersection between a reduced cost response curve and a normal cost response curve,
where on the response curve containing the inflection, the intersection is at a larger value
of the ordering quantity than that of the point of inflection.
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Figure 40: Response functions for Qc and Qnc,i, where cn=16 and cn=13.

As

increases, an inflection point first develops in the response curve for the

central retailer for the normal cost per unit bought from the supplier. Thus for this case,
carefully chosen combinations of

and

result in a second intersection between the

reduced cost response curve of the non-central retailer and the normal cost response
curve of the central retailer. This intersection is at a smaller value of

than the value of

at the inflection point on the normal cost response curve for the central retailer and is
labeled as Equilibrium C2b. Figure 41 shows an example combination of
results in this type of response function graph.
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and

that

Figure 41: Response functions for Qc and Qnc,i, where cn=18 and cr=13.

As

continues to increase, an inflection point develops in the response curve for the

non-central retailer when using a normal cost per unit bought from the supplier. While
Equilibrium C2a and Equilibrium C2b no longer are in existence, it is possible to obtain
response functions that result in the existence of both Equilibrium C1a and Equilibrium
C1b. Equilibrium C1b identifies the intersection of a smaller value of

or

than

the value of that ordering quantity at the inflection point on the normal cost response
curve for the non-central retailer. Figure 42 shows an example combination of
that results in this type of response function graph.
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and

Figure 42: Response functions for Qc and Qnc,i, where cn=20 and cr=13.

4.3.2: Supplier Decisions
The supplier has control of several variables that affect the expected profits for
both the supplier and the retailers. Included in these variables is the discount triggering
quantity, the normal cost per unit bought from the supplier, and the reduced cost per unit
bought from the supplier. Through the variation of the normal cost per unit bought from
the supplier and the reduced cost per unit bought from the supplier, the supplier can affect
which stable regions exist for the retailers.

Through the variation of the discount

triggering quantity, the supplier can control the retailer decisions regarding which
equilibrium the retailers will order in accordance with.
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In order to optimize the expected supplier profit and other measures of supplier
performance, the supplier can start by analyzing how the variation of the discount
triggering quantity affects the ordering quantities of the retailers. The supplier must
consider the stability or retailer decisions for different values of the discount triggering
quantity. We extend the definition of stability from the definition for the two retailer
system so that it is suited to the three retailer system. Thus, in the three retailer system,
we define:
a region of the discount triggering quantity is defined to be stable if an
equilibrium is in existence that results in the largest expected retailer profit
for all involved retailers out of all possible equilibria in existence for that
particular value of the discount triggering quantity.
An example graph of the expected retailer profit for a specific combination of values for
and

is shown in Figure 43. The legend for Figure 43 as well as the ordering

quantities for each retailer at each of the equilibria is given in Table 12.
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Figure 43: Expected retailer profit as x changes in the three retailer system where
cn=18 cr=13.
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and . Table 13 shows the stable regions
0
5
15
20
10 10
5 discount triggering quantity that pertains
of the
to Figure 43.5
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Retailer's Choice
x

to

Choice

Supplier's Profit Trend

B

Increasing as x increases

Unstable

Unstable

C1a

Increasing as x increases

Unstable

Unstable

A

Constant as x increases

Table 13: Retailer’s choice in equilibrium and the supplier’s expected profit trend
given the value of x.

Here:
is the ordering quantity of the central retailer at Equilibrium C2b.
is the ordering quantity of the central retailer at Equilibrium C1a.
is the discount triggering quantity where the expected profit for a noncentral retailer at Equilibrium C2b and Equilibrium C1a is equal.
is the discount triggering quantity where the expected profit for the central
retailer at Equilibrium C1a and Equilibrium A is equal.
Using the information in Table 13, the supplier can evaluate the expected supplier profit
in each of the possible stable regions for the discount triggering quantity. Within some of
the stable regions the expected supplier profit increases as the discount triggering
quantity is increased. Within these regions the supplier will set the discount triggering
quantity to the highest value possible while remaining in the stable region in order to
receive the highest possible expected profit while keeping the retailers ordering according
to the associated stable equilibrium for that region. Table 14 shows the expected supplier
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profit for each of the values of the discount triggering quantity that can be used in this
example.
Supplier

Central

Non-Central

Equilibrium

Profit

Retailer Profit

Retailer Profit

198.459

486.255

478.789

B

7308.39

3322.13

3013.64

522.472

632.556

198.459

C1a

7685.38

2792.88

2405.77

Infinity

302.936

284.42

A

6974.21

2792.88

2236.51

Table 14: Expected supplier profit for the each of the possible supplier choices of the
discount triggering quantity; cn=18, cr=13.

Thus in this example, where the combination of

and

is used, the

supplier should set the discount triggering quantity, x, to 522.472 in order to maximize
the expected supplier profit.
In order to determine the values of

and

that result in the highest expected

supplier profit, the process of analysis demonstrated by the previous example must be
conducted for various values of

and

. As a result trends in the expected supplier

profit as well as in the expected retailer profits can been seen. Figure 44 shows the
change in expected profit for the supplier and retailers as
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changes.

Figure 44: Changes in supplier expected profit, central retailer expected profit, and
non-central retailer expected profit as cn changes; cr=13

Note that the expected supplier profit increases and both the expected central retailer
profit and the expected non-central retailer profit both decrease as

increases. This

result is consistent with the two retailer case that is analyzed in Chapter 3. Figure 45
shows the change in expected profit for the supplier and retailers as
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changes.

Figure 45: Changes in supplier expected profit, central retailer expected profit, and
non-central retailer expected profit as cr changes; cn=25

Note that the highest expected supplier profit occurs when the value of

is the lowest.

The results presented in Figure 44 and Figure 45 lead to the conclusion that the supplier
will receive the highest expected profit when the supplier sets the value of
possible within the limits of the system and

as high as

as low as possible within the limits of the

system. This conclusion for the three retailer system is consistent with the conclusion for
the two retailer system.
The abrupt changes in the slopes of the expected profit shown in Figure 44 and
Figure 45 are a result of the characteristics of the stable regions of the discount triggering
quantity and their impact on the largest expected supplier profit from the available stable
equilibria. Consequently, the equilibria that the retailers ordering according to change as
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and

change. Table 15 and Table 16 show how expected profit changes as the

equilibriums are changed in more detail.
Supplier
Profit

Central Retailer

Non-Central

Equilibrium

Profit

Retailer Profit

14

405.12

5546.86

486.255

478.789

B

3909.31

3600.82

15

340.312

6373.37

486.255

478.789

B

3633.81

3325.31

16

282.603

6874.93

486.255

478.789

B

3466.62

3158.13

17

508.022

7249.57

597.407

244.661

C1a

3061.58

2613.76

18

522.472

7685.38

23.404

583.409

C2b

2792.88

2405.77

19

549.229

8021.43

675.741

149.935

C1a

2535.46

2253.32

20

716.953

8263.42

802.184

41.9095

C1b

2287.9

2225.27

21

283.155

11127.2

486.255

478.789

B

2049.19

1740.7

22

277.313

11819

486.255

478.789

B

1818.61

1510.12

23

271.876

12487.8

486.255

478.789

B

1595.67

1287.18

24

266.765

13134.8

486.255

478.789

B

1380.01

1071.52

25

261.917

13760.5

486.255

478.789

B

1171.42

862.93

Table 15: Changes in supplier expected profit, central retailer expected profit, and
non-central retailer expected profit as cn changes; cr=13.
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Supplier
Profit

Equilibrium

Central Retailer

Non-Central

Profit

Retailer Profit

11

288.152

14251.7

718.56

715.378

B

1171.42

1062.28

12

272.541

14025.1

569.593

564.207

B

1171.42

955.09

13

261.917

13760.5

486.255

478.789

B

1171.42

862.93

14

253.78

13452.8

429.563

419.973

B

1171.42

786.65

15

247.102

13103.5

387.219

375.437

B

1171.42

725.15

16

241.364

12716

353.744

339.722

B

1171.42

676.96

17

236.27

12293.3

326.225

309.948

B

1171.42

640.68

18

226.067

11935.9

302.936

284.42

B

1138.98

582.62

19

60.86

8357.53

282.767

262.064

B

2170.3

1597.85

20

88.816

8825.05

264.968

242.156

B

1843.83

1263.85

21

108.753

8976.32

249.007

224.192

B

1614.18

1034.36

22

267.611

8667.96

23.273

279.716

C2b

1461.1

722.4

23

268.393

8056.05

0.283

268.393

C2b

1376.6

831.65

24

152.947

8383.68

208.669

178.695

B

1227.07

686.18

Table 16: Changes in supplier expected profit, central retailer expected profit, and
non-central retailer expected profit as cr changes; cn =25.

Note that the abrupt changes in the slope of the expected profits in Figure 44 and Figure
45 are a result of changing existences of the equilibria and do not necessarily reflect
changes in the choice of equilibrium as shown in Table 15 and Table 16. In such cases
where an abrupt change in the slope of the expected profits occurs, the boundaries of the
stable region on the retailers’ chosen equilibrium are changed by the existence of other
equilibria. Though these changes in the potential equilibria may not affect the retailers’
decision, it allows the supplier to change the value of the discount triggering quantity
while the retailers remain on the same equilibrium.
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4.3.3: Comparison of the Two Retailer and Three Retailer Systems and
Retailer Decisions
One of the fundamental reasons for the study of the three retailer transshipment
with quantity discounts system is to evaluate the value added to each of the entities
within the system through the addition of an additional retailer entering into a
transshipment agreement with one of the retailers that already exists in the system. It is
assumed that the decision of adding an additional retailer into the transshipment system
lies with the retailers and with the supplier. This is because the transshipment agreement
between the retailers is not controlled by the supplier. The supplier only controls the
form and cost parameters of the contract for purchase of their product by the retailers.
Thus, knowing the value of an additional transshipment partner is important to the
retailers to determine if it is advantageous for them to add an additional retailer into the
system. The suppliers understanding of this value helps the supplier determine if the
addition of another retailer into the transshipment system should be encouraged or
discouraged. Table 17 gives a comparison between the two retailer transshipment system
and the three retailer transshipment system. It is assumed that the third retailer in the two
retailer transshipment system acts as an independent newsvendor, unable to transship,
and orders according to Equation 3.
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Two Retailer Transshipment with Quantity Discount System

337.231 899.522

27.19

169.46

Retailer

Retailer

Profit

Profit

2596.12

2596.12

Newsvendor Supplier
Profit

Profit

458.106

10456.3

Three Retailer Transshipment with Quantity Discount System
Central

Non-Central

Non-Central

Retailer

Retailer

Retailer

Profit

Profit

Profit

Profit

1062.28

1062.28

14251.7

288.152 715.378 718.56 715.378 1171.42

Supplier

Table 17: Comparison between two retailer and three retailer transshipment models
when using cn=25, cr=11, and exponential demand with mean of 200

From Table 17 it can be seen that the two retailers in the two retailer
transshipment system have an expected profit that is more than double the expected profit
of for any of the retailers in the three retailer system. Thus, it will result in a reduced
expected profit for both retailers if either retailer from the two retailer system decides to
acquire an additional transshipment partner. However, if a second transshipment partner
is added by either of the two retailers from the two retailer transshipment system, then the
supplier’s expected profit will increase. Additionally, in the three retailer transshipment
case, the newsvendor’s expected profit more than doubles by entering into the
transshipment agreement.
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Chapter 5: Analysis of Different Quantity Discounts in a Two
Retailer Transshipment System
Previously, a two-block tariff quantity discount has been used in the analysis of
the two retailer transshipment with quantity discounts (Chapter 3) case as well as in the
three retailer transshipment with a central retailer and quantity discounts case (Chapter
4). In this chapter, we examine three types of quantity discounts defined in (Dolan,
1987), which are the two-block tariff, two-part tariff, and the all-units quantity discounts
in a two retailer transshipment system. Analyzing the different quantity discount types in
a transshipment scenario is important to the supplier in order for the supplier to determine
which quantity discount best achieves the supplier’s goals when combined with the
retailer’s ability to transship.

5.1:

Two-Block Tariff Quantity Discount

A two-block tariff quantity discount is defined (Dolan, 1987), as:

Where

is the total charged to the retailer for quantity q. Here the retailers pay a

price p1 that is charged per unit for all units up to a quantity x and all units purchased
greater than x are charged a price p2 per unit (where p1 > p2). In the two retailer
transshipment with quantity discounts scenario, we define the expected profit for retailer i
when a two-block tariff quantity discount is offered,
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, as:

(9)
For the purposes of this analysis define the expected profit for retailer i while ordering
according to the function distinguished by the normal cost from the supplier,

, as :
(47)

and define the expected profit for retailer i while ordering according to the function
distinguished by the discounted cost from the supplier,

, as:
(48)

where
(49)
Carrying out the expectation operator from Equation 49 and rewriting it in integral form
results in the following equation:
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(50)
The response functions in this case are found by taking the derivative of Equation 47 and
Equation 48 with respect to

. Similar to Equation 15, the response function for retailer
110

i while ordering according to the function distinguished by the normal cost from the
supplier is given in Equation 51.
(51)
Similar to Equation 14, the response function for retailer i while ordering according to the
function distinguished by the discounted cost from the supplier is given in Equation 52
(52)
where

is the derivative of

with respect to

and is defined in

Chapter 3 as:

(13)

5.2:

A Modified Two-Part Tariff Quantity Discount

A two-part tariff quantity discount is defined as:

111

Here the retailers pay a fixed cost F, in order to purchase units at a price p, that is charged
per unit.
For the purposes of comparing the different quantity discounts, a variation of the
two-part tariff quantity discount, as defined in (Dolan, 1987) is used. Consider that when
the two-part tariff quantity discount is offered, the retailer has the choice of paying the
fixed cost to be able to purchase all units at a discounted price p2 per unit, or not paying
the fixed cost and paying price p1 per unit (where p1 > p2).

In the two retailer transshipment with quantity discounts scenario, we define the
expected profit for retailer i when a modified two-part tariff quantity discount is offered,
, as:
(53)
For the purposes of this analysis we define the expected profit for retailer i while ordering
according to the function distinguished by the normal cost from the supplier,

, as :
(54)

and we define the expected profit for retailer i while ordering according to the function
distinguished by the discounted cost from the supplier,

, as:
(55)

Similar to the case described in the previous section, the response function for the
modified two-part tariff case is found by taking the derivative of the profit function,
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Equation 53, with respect to

. Thus, the response function for retailer i while ordering

according to the function distinguished by the normal cost from the supplier is given in
Equation 56.
(56)
The response function for retailer i while ordering according to the function distinguished
by the discounted cost from the supplier is given in Equation 57.
(57)

5.3:

All-Units Quantity Discount

Recall, in Chapter 2, that an all-units quantity discount is defined as:

Here a retailer pays a price

per unit purchased if the ordering quantity is below the

discount triggering quantity, x, and pay a price

per unit purchased if the ordering

quantity is above the quantity discount point (where p1 > p2).
In the two retailer transshipment with quantity discounts scenario, we define the
expected profit for retailer i when an all-units quantity discount is offered,

, as:
(58)

Define the expected profit for retailer i while ordering according to the function
distinguished by the normal cost from the supplier,

, as :
(59)

and define the expected profit for retailer i while ordering according to the function
distinguished by the discounted cost from the supplier,
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, as:

(60)
Similar to the cases described in the two previous sections, the response function
for the all-units quantity discount case is found by taking the derivative of the profit
function, Equation 58, with respect to

. Thus, the response function for retailer i while

ordering according to the function distinguished by the normal cost from the supplier is
given in Equation 61.
(61)
The response function for retailer i while ordering according to the function distinguished
by the discounted cost from the supplier is given in Equation 62.
(62)

5.4:

Comparison of Different Quantity Discounts

This section gives an analysis of the three types of quantity discounts (two-block
tariff, modified two-part tariff, and all-units) discussed in this chapter. First, an analysis
of the response functions of the different quantity discounts is presented. The resulting
supplier and retailer decisions are then analyzed for the three types of quantity discounts.
Lastly, the resulting profits are compared and conclusions are made about the impact that
the different quantity discounts have on supplier and retailer profits.
A comparison of the mathematical derivative expressions used in the response
functions representing the response of retailer i while on the response curve distinguished
by the normal cost from the supplier shows these components of the response functions
are equivalent, such that:
(63)
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Similarly, a comparison of the mathematical derivative expressions used in the response
functions representing the response of retailer i while on the response curve distinguished
by the discounted cost from the supplier shows that these components of the response
functions are equivalent, such that:
(64)
Though the components that make up the response functions do not differ between
different quantity discount types, the response functions in their entirety do differ
between different quantity discount types. This is due to the different characteristics of
the quantity discounts that determine when and by what mechanism the discount engages.
The components must be composed into the entire response function for each case based
on the logic of the discount being considered. This determines which response curve the
retailer’s response is based on. Likewise, the existence of different potential equilibrium
points is based on the interaction between the two retailer’s overall response functions for
each type of quantity discount.
In the two-block tariff case, the discount triggering quantity, x, determines the
point at which the retailer’s response jumps between the normal and discounted response
curves. Additionally, the relative value of x determines the existence of the four possible
equilibria. This can be seen in Figure 46. Note the discontinuity in the response function
at the value of x for each retailer.
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Figure 46: Two-block tariff quantity discount response function. The response
functions are described in detail in…

The two-part tariff case differs from the other cases in that there is no discontinuity in the
response function. Thus, the existence of the equilibria is not determined by any variable
other than the cost parameters. The four equilibria are always in existence. An example
of the response function when a two-part tariff quantity discount is used is shown in
Figure 47.
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Figure 47: Two-part tariff quantity discount response function

The response function of the all-units quantity discount case is similar to the twoblock tariff case due to both of the response functions having a discontinuity at the point
of the discount triggering quantity. Here there is a discontinuity at the discount triggering
quantity that determines on which response curve the retailer’s response is based. Also,
like the two-block tariff case, in the all-units case, x determines the existence of the four
equilibria. A response function graph of the all-units quantity discount case can be seen
in Figure 48.

117

Figure 48: All units quantity discount response function

At each of the potential equilibria that are a result of the response function
interactions between the retailers, the possible expected profits can be determined for
each quantity discount type. Figure 49 shows the expected profit for retailer i for each of
the equilibria when a two-block tariff quantity discount is used. Note that the equilibria
only exist within certain ranges, which are controlled by the value of x.
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Figure 49: Retailer's expected profit as x changes when a two-block tariff quantity
discount is offered.

The two-block tariff case offers the largest number of possible stable equilibria for the
supplier to choose from, when deciding the value of the discount triggering quantity, of
the three different quantity discount cases. Table 18 gives an overview of the retailer’s
choice within each of those stable ranges and the supplier’s profit trend within those
ranges.
Retailer's Choice
x

Choice

Supplier's Profit Trend

B

Increasing as x increases

Unstable

Unstable

C

-

Unstable

Unstable

A

Constant as x increases

Table 18: Retailers's choice of equilibrium given x when a two-block tariff quantity
discount is offered.

119

Let

be defined as the value of x at which the expected profits for retailer i and

retailer j are equal while the retailers are ordering according to a C equilibrium and a twoblock tariff quantity discount is offered. Therefore
(65)
where

(66)
The two-part tariff quantity discount case results in a similar retailer expected
profit graph as in the two-block tariff quantity discount case. Figure 50 shows the
expected retailer profit when a two-part tariff quantity discount is offered. Note that the
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difference between Figure 49 and Figure 50 is that when a two-part tariff quantity
discount is offered, the existences of the equilibria are not controlled by any variable that
is characteristic to the quantity discount where as in the two-block tariff quantity discount
case, the existence of the equilibria is controlled by x. The result is that in the two-part
tariff quantity discount case, there is only one stable point for F.

Figure 50: Retailer's expected profit as F changes when a two-part tariff quantity
discount is offered.

Table 19 gives an overview of the retailer’s choice within each of stable region when a
two-part tariff quantity discount is used.
Retailer's Choice
F

Choice

Supplier's Profit Trend

Unstable

Unstable

C

-

Unstable

Unstable

Table 19: Retailers's choice of equilibrium given F when a two-block tariff quantity
discount is offered.

121

Note that in the two-part tariff case exactly one stable value of F exists. This is due to
there being no variable controlling the existence of the equilibria. It turns out that
because all potential equilibria are present at all times, only one fulfills the stability
criteria. Therefore, the single existing value of F is identified by

, and is defined

as:
(67)
Though the response functions of the two-block tariff quantity discount and the
all-units quantity discount cases are identical, the retailer’s expected profits are not
because of the differences in the discount mechanisms. Figure 51 shows the retailer’s
expected profit for the all-units quantity discount case.

Figure 51: Retailer's expected profit as x changes when an all-units quantity
discount is offered.
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From Figure 51 it can be seen that no equilibrium meets the stability criteria when
Equilibrium C is in existence. The regions of x where an equilibrium meeting the
stability criteria exists are for smaller values of x and larger values of x. Table 20 shows
the stable regions for the all-units quantity discount case.
Retailer's Choice
x

Choice

Supplier's Profit Trend

B

Increasing as x increases

Unstable

Unstable

A

Constant as x increases

Table 20: Retailers's choice of equilibrium given x when an all-units quantity
discount is offered.

5.5:

The Effects of Different Quantity Discounts on Supplier

Decisions
The examination of different quantity discounts on supplier profit is an important
topic because the supplier determines which quantity discount is offered to the retailers.
Differences between the different quantity discounts, as related to the supplier, include
the available stable regions of x (or F, in the case of the two-block tariff quantity
discount) and the expected supplier profit. Thus, it is important to the supplier to analyze
the effects of the different quantity discounts.
In order to determine which quantity discount type a supplier should offer, the
differences in profit between the use of the different quantity discounts are examined.
Table 21 shows the expected profits and possible choices for the value of the discount
triggering quantity for the two-block tariff quantity discount case.
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Two-Block Tariff Quantity Discount
Equilibrium

x

Retailer Profit

Supplier Profit

A
B
C (high)
C (low)
Table 21: Potential stable values of x and the associated ordering quantities,
expected retailer profits, and expected supplier profits for the two-block tariff
quantity discount case.

Note that in the two-block tariff quantity discount case stable values of x exist for all
three equilibria. Section 3.3.4 describes the conditions for stability.
Table 22 shows the expected profits and possible choices for the value of the
discount triggering quantity for the two-part tariff quantity discount case.
Two-Part Tariff Quantity Discount
Equilibrium

F

Retailer Profit

Supplier Profit

A

-

-

-

B

-

-

-

C (high)
C (low)
Table 22: Potential stable values of F and the associated ordering quantities,
expected retailer profits, and expected supplier profits for the two-part tariff
quantity discount case.

Here the definition of stability adjusted to account for F, such that a stable region is
defined as a region, distinguished by the fixed cost, where
1.

the expected profit for retailer i is equal to the expected profit for retailer j
and
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2.

the two retailers are at an equilibrium that has a larger expected profit for
both retailers than any other equilibrium that is in existence for a particular
value of F.

Note that in the two-part tariff quantity discount case, only the C equilibrium is
obtainable as a stable solution for the retailer’s ordering quantities.
Table 23 shows the expected profits and possible choices for the value of the
discount triggering quantity for the all-units quantity discount case.
All-Units Quantity Discount
Equilibrium

x

Retailer Profit

Supplier Profit

C (high)

-

-

-

C (low)

-

-

-

A
B

Table 23: Potential stable values of x and the associated ordering quantities,
expected retailer profits, and expected supplier profits for the all-units quantity
discount case.

As Table 23 shows, stable values of x can be found for Equilibrium A and Equilibrium B,
but there is no stable value of x, for Equilibrium C.
Keep in mind that ordering quantities are different within each table and are
labeled by the equilibrium representing each particular set of ordering quantities. Though
this prevents direct comparisons to be made between expected profits at different
equilibriums, direct comparisons can be made between different quantity discount types
when the retailers are ordering according to a common equilibrium. This is because the
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ordering quantities for each equilibrium remain constant between the different quantity
discount types.
A direct comparison can be made for the Equilibrium A and Equilibrium B
solutions between the two-block tariff quantity discount case and the all-units quantity
discount case. It is evident from the supplier profits shown in Table 21 and Table 23 that
the two-block tariff quantity discount results in an expected supplier profit that is equal to
that of the all-units quantity discount when the retailers order according to Equilibrium A.
Additionally, the two-block tariff quantity discount results in an expected supplier profit
that is greater than that of the all-units quantity discount when the retailer order according
to Equilibrium B.

Proposition 3: The response function for the all-units quantity discount and the response
function for the two-block tariff quantity discount result in the same equilibria

Proof: The response curve functions are found by taking the derivative of the retailer i
expected profit functions with respect to

. This process leads to the response curve

functions given in Equation 51 and Equation 52 for the two-block tariff quantity discount
case and in Equation 61 and Equation 62 for the all-units quantity discount case. Thus, it
can be shown that the two response curves that are used in the response function are
identical when comparing the two-block tariff and all-units quantity discounts.
In addition to the response curves being identical, the condition in the response
functions that determines which response curve is being used must also be the same.
This indeed holds as well, because in both cases the discount triggering quantity, x
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determines which response curve is used, such that for each quantity discount case, when
, the response curve associated with the normal cost from supplier is used and
when

the response curve associated with the discounted cost from the supplier is

used.
Since the response functions of these two cases share these similarities, the
equilibria will be the same in both cases.

Additionally since the condition for

determining which response curve is being used is the same for both quantity discount
cases, the existence for the equilibria will always be the same as long as the same
discount triggering quantity is being used in each case. ■

Proposition 4: The expected supplier profit when a two-block tariff quantity discount is
used is greater than or equal to the expected supplier profit when an all-units quantity
discount is used

Proof: Due to the unstable regions on x in the all-units quantity discount case, it is only
possible to get a stable equilibrium where the retailers order according to Equilibrium A
or Equilibrium B. The response functions of both quantity discount types result in the
same Equilibrium points, thus direct comparisons can be made between the different
quantity discount types where the retailers are ordering according to a common
equilibrium. When the retailers are ordering according to Equilibrium A, the expected
supplier profit for both the two-block tariff quantity discount and the all-units quantity
discount are equal; such that:
(68)
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When the retailers are ordering according to Equilibrium B, then the expected supplier
profit for the case where a two-block tariff quantity discount is used is strictly greater
than the expected supplier profit for the case where an all-units quantity discount is used;
such that:
(69)
Thus, when comparing the expect supplier profits, the all-units quantity discount case is
at best, equal to the two-block tariff quantity discount, which only occurs when
and

. The

expected suppler profit for the two-block tariff quantity discount case is greater than the
expected profit for the two-block tariff case when either
■

or

Thus, the two-block tariff quantity discount is the preferred choice for a quantity
discount over the all-units quantity discount for the following reasons:
1

When the retailers order in accordance to Equilibrium B, the expected
supplier profit when a two-block tariff quantity discount is used is always
greater than the expected supplier profit when an all-units quantity
discount is used.

2

When the retailers order in accordance to Equilibrium C, there is no stable
value of x in the all-units quantity discount case, thus the all-units quantity
discount is not an option if the supplier wishes to set the discount
triggering quantity within this range of existence.
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3

When the retailers order in accordance to Equilibrium A, the expected
supplier profit is equal for both discount schemes.

A direct comparison can be made for the Equilibrium C solution between the twoblock tariff quantity discount case and the two-part tariff quantity discount case. It is
evident from the supplier profits shown in Table 21 and Table 22 that the two-block tariff
quantity discount results in an expected supplier profit that is equal to that of the two-part
tariff quantity discount when the retailers order according to Equilibrium C.

Proposition 5: When the retailers are ordering according to Equilibrium C, the expected
supplier profit when a two-block tariff quantity discount is used is equal to the expected
supplier profit when a two-part tariff quantity discount is used.

Proof: Due to the unstable regions on F in the two-part tariff quantity discount case, it is
only possible to get a stable equilibrium where the retailers order according to
Equilibrium C. Again, the response functions of both quantity discount types result in the
same Equilibrium points, allowing direct comparisons to be made between the different
quantity discount types where the retailers are ordering according to a common
equilibrium. When the retailers are ordering according to Equilibrium C, the expected
supplier profit for both the two-block tariff quantity discount case and the two-part tariff
quantity discount case are equal.
; we can solve for

Given that

and

in both equations and then set them equal to each

other resulting in:
(70)
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Thus it is evident that

(71)
■
Therefore, the two-block tariff quantity discount is the preferred choice for a
quantity discount over the two-part tariff quantity discount for the following reasons:
1

When the retailers order in accordance to Equilibrium C, the expected
supplier profit is equal for the two quantity discount types.

2

When the retailers order in accordance to Equilibrium A or Equilibrium B,
there is no stable value of F in the two-part tariff quantity discount case,
thus the two-part tariff quantity discount is not an option if the supplier
wishes to set the discount triggering quantity within this range of
existence.

The two-block tariff quantity discount is the preferred choice by the supplier over
the two-part tariff quantity discount and the all-units quantity discount. The two-block
quantity discount offers more options to the supplier when setting the discount triggering
quantity than the other two quantity discount types examined.

The two-part tariff

quantity discount and the all-units quantity discount never result in a greater expected
supplier profit than the two-block tariff quantity discount. Additionally, the two-block
quantity discount has a greater supplier expected profit when the retailers order according
to Equilibrium B than the all-units quantity discount.
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Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusions
This dissertation extends the current literature by analyzing the impact of the
supplier offering quantity discounts in transshipment systems. More specifically, this
dissertation contributes to the knowledge in inventory systems by studying quantity
discounts in two retailer transshipment systems, three retailer transshipment systems
where one retailer is central, and by analyzing different quantity discount schemes in the
two retailer transshipment system. Many insights regarding transshipment systems are
gained through the research presented in this dissertation. The insights gained through
this research are both important for real-world use and to future research on the topic of
transshipment.
This dissertation first develops a model including a two-block tariff quantity
discount pricing contract that is offered by a supplier to two independent newsvendor
retailers. A methodology is developed for carefully building expected profit functions
and response functions in a two retailer transshipment with quantity discounts system.
These models are similar to those that exist in literature with the exception that quantity
discount structure turns the functions into piecewise functions. Instead of having a single
cost per unit purchased from the supplier, the quantity discount scheme creates a
discontinuity at the discount triggering quantity. Using the two-block tariff quantity
discount scheme in a transshipment model results in the two retailers having four
potential equilibrium quantity combinations to consider, rather than just one when the
supplier does not offer a pricing contract with a quantity discount. Two of the potential
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retailer equilibrium combinations have symmetric retailer ordering quantities, while the
other two potential retailer equilibrium combinations have non-symmetric ordering
quantities. This is in spite of otherwise symmetric cost and demand parameters.
In order to analyze this system, a methodology for analyzing multiple potential
equilibria is developed.

This methodology includes extending the understanding of

equilibrium behavior in these systems by defining stable values of the discount triggering
quantity. A stable value of the discount triggering quantity is defined as a value of the
discount triggering quantity where the expected profit for all retailers is at an equilibrium
that has a larger expected profit for all retailers than any other equilibrium that is in
existence for a particular value of the discount triggering quantity. The resolving of
supplier and retailer choices is done based upon this new stability criteria. Using this
definition we find that there exists a single value of the discount triggering quantity that
results in the two symmetric retailers having different ordering quantities. Additionally,
the expected profit for both retailers and the supplier is greater than that of the
transshipment model without quantity discounts.
The quantity discount cost parameters are chosen by the supplier. Strategically,
the supplier should choose the pricing parameters within a range so that the retailers have
a non-symmetric equilibrium to consider, since this can lead to the highest profits for the
supplier.

Also, the supplier must carefully choose a stable value of the discount

triggering quantity so that the retailers have equal profits, allowing the equilibrium to
exist. When the supplier is successful, the supplier’s profit will increase when the value
of normal cost per unit is as large as is feasible and the value of the reduced cost per unit
is as small as is feasible. Decreasing the value of the reduced cost per unit also increases
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each retailer’s profit, while increasing the value of the normal cost per unit decreases
each retailer’s profit. Setting the pricing parameters for the quantity discount at their
extreme boundaries is good for motivating the retailers and achieving maximum profits.
A naïve thought process might suggest that allowing transshipment agreements
will lower the volume of items sold and as a result, lower supplier profit. While this is
true without quantity discounts, the offering of a quantity discount actually increases
profits for both the supplier and the retailers. When quantity discounts are offered, it is
evident that there is value to the supplier in allowing limited cooperation among the
retailers through transshipment agreements.
The research on a two retailer transshipment system with quantity discounts
described in this dissertation is significant to the current literature on transshipment
because it shows that the optimal ordering quantities for the retailers have the following
properties:
1

Satisfy the first order equilibrium conditions

2

Are not symmetric for the two retailers even though the quantity discount
offered to the two retailers by the supplier is identical, all costs are
symmetric for the two retailers, and the two retailers are competitive and
thus not cooperating in making ordering quantity decisions.

3

Result in improved profits for each retailer over the symmetric equilibrium
solutions.

4

Result in improved profits for the supplier.

An important observation in this system is that the methodology in determining
the ordering quantities for the retailers results in one retailer acting as a “warehouse”.
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The “warehouse” retailer orders a large amount of inventory while the other retailer
orders a small amount of inventory. The difference between the two ordering quantities
becomes even larger as the difference between the normal cost per unit and the reduced
cost per unit from the supplier becomes larger.

From the supplier’s perspective,

controlling the two cost per unit variables allows the supplier to force the two retailers to
the two extremes, which results in a larger expected profit for the supplier.
The research on the transshipment system with quantity discounts is further
explored through the addition of an additional transshipment partner added to the system.
This system involves a third retailer where one retailer can transship with the other two
retailers; however, the other two retailers cannot transship with each other. While the
methodology remains similar to the two retailer transshipment system, the addition of a
third retailer makes the derivation of the expected profit response functions much more
complex. The complexity is a result of the transshipment process, the events of which
now occur in the three-dimensional space as oppose to the two-dimensional space. While
complex, the transshipment event graphs and summing of the pdfs helped verify and
validate the transshipment model.
Through analyzing this system with a game theoretic approach, we show that for
some cases the following changes occur to the expected profits:
1

Two retailers currently in a transshipment agreement have a decrease in
expected profit if either of them takes on another transshipment agreement
(going from two to three retailers transshipping).

2

A retailer who previously operated independently as a standard
newsvendor where quantity discounts are offered sees an increase in
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expected profit by entering in the transshipment agreement with the
central retailer.
3

The central retailer has a greater expected profit than each of the two noncentral retailers.

4

The supplier has an increase in expected profit.

Consider two retailers that already have a two way transshipment agreement. If a third
retailer joins into an transshipment agreement with one of the two original retailers, then
both of the retailers currently in a transshipment agreement will have a decrease in
expected profit. When the choice to enter into an additional transshipment contract
belongs to the retailers and not the supplier, neither of two retailers that currently have a
transshipment agreement should enter into a transshipment agreement with another
retailer based on the parameters we studied in chapter four. If however one of them does
enter into transshipment agreement with another retailer, then the retailer that was not
originally part of the transshipment agreement and the supplier would have an increase in
expected profit. Thus, the supplier and the independent retailer should be in favor of the
additional transshipment agreement as both of them will experience an increase in
expected profit.
A comparison is made between value of different quantity discounts schemes to
the supplier. Three different quantity discount types are examined when used in a two
retailer transshipment system. The three quantity discount types examined are: two-block
tariff, two-part tariff, and all-units quantity discounts. Though the quantity discounts
share some similarities, it is found that the two-block tariff is the best choice of quantity
discount for the supplier to offer to the retailers. The supplier’s choice of being able to
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determine the type of quantity discount offered helps the supplier coordinate activity
among a collection of competing, independent, transshipping retailers.
When comparing the two-block tariff quantity discount to the modified two-part
tariff quantity discount it is found that for equilibriums that are common between the two
quantity discount types, the two quantity discounts result in the same expected retailer
and supplier profits. While the two-block tariff quantity discount has the possibility of
four different equilibria (A, B, C1, and C2), the two-part tariff quantity discount only has
the possibility of two equilibria (C1 and C2). Though the expected profits are the same
for the C1 and C2 equilibria between both types, the two-block tariff quantity discount is
preferred by the supplier due to the flexibility in stable regions and larger amount of
choices for the discount triggering quantity over the two-part tariff quantity discount.
When comparing the two-block tariff quantity discount to the all-units quantity
discount it is found that the two-block tariff quantity discount is preferred over the allunits quantity discount because of increased expected profits and flexibility. The allunits quantity discount results in only two equilibria (A and B), while the two-block tariff
quantity discount results in the existence of all four equilibria (A, B, C1, and C2) and
thus is more flexible then the all-units quantity discount. It is proven that when the
retailers are ordering according to Equilibrium B, then the expected supplier profit for the
two-block tariff quantity discount case is strictly greater than when the all-units quantity
discount is used. The only time that the expected supplier profit between the two cases is
equal is when the two retailers are ordering according to Equilibrium A. When the
retailers order according to any other equilibrium, the two-block tariff quantity discount
either has a greater expected profit for the supplier or the equilibria do not exist in the all-
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units quantity discount case, in which case the two-block tariff quantity discount has the
possibility of their existence.
This research lays the groundwork and gives the fundamental model for future
work in the area of transshipments and quantity discounts. An interesting problem in this
area would be to determine if there are any other combinations of transshipment partners
that result in increases in expected retailer profits as well as expected supplier profits.
This leads into another possible problem to solve which is how to resolve the
transshipment allocation when two or more retailers have access to the same leftover
stock. This problem in particular may lead to an answer to the previous question if the
transshipment allocation is unequal and in favor of the retailers previously existing in a
transshipment agreement before an additional retailer joins in the agreement.
Another point of interest would be evaluating altered or more complex quantity
discount schemes to determine if any particular characteristic about the quantity
discounts tends to lead to better results. In particular, a multi-step, two-block tariff
quantity discount scheme could lead to interesting results depending upon the amount of
transshipment partners in an agreement and how that agreement is set up. It may be
possible in a transshipment system with multiple retailers that each retailer could be
ordering on different steps of a multi-step, two-block tariff quantity discount scheme. A
similar comparison could be made using a multi-step all units quantity discount scheme.
Additional points of interest include determining optimal transshipment costs, limiting
the system through limiting storage capabilities, and examining the effects of allowing
the retailers to refuse to transship. Examining these systems in a transshipment system
with quantity discounts could lead to interesting results.
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Appendix B
Integral Form of

and

The following equations are taken from a Wolfram Mathematica file. Here the central
retailer is Retailer, and the non-central retailers are Retailer 1 and Retailer 3
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Appendix D
Integral Form of

and

The following equations are taken from a Wolfram Mathematica file. Here the central
retailer is Retailer 2, and the non-central retailers are Retailer 1 and Retailer 3.
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Appendix E
Three Retailer Transshipment Event Graph Breakdown
The figures in this appendix show the breakdown of the transshipment events in
the three retailer transshipment system. In the figures in this appendix, the central retailer
is Retailer 2 and the non-central retailers are Retailer 1 and Retailer 3.

Figure 52: Excess demand for Retailer 2 and Retailer 3. Excess inventory for
Retailer 1. Transshipment from Retailer 1 to Retailer 2 in the amount of
.
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Figure 53: Excess demand for Retailer 2 and Retailer 3. Excess inventory for
Retailer 1. Transshipment from Retailer 1 to Retailer 2 in the amount of
.

Figure 54: Excess demand for Retailer 2. Excess inventory for Retailer 1 and
Retailer 3. Transshipment from Retailer 1 to Retailer 2 in the amount of
.
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Figure 55: Excess demand for Retailer 2. Excess inventory for Retailer 1 and
Retailer 3. Transshipment from Retailer 1 to Retailer 2 in the amount of
.

Figure 56: Excess demand for Retailer 2. Excess inventory for Retailer 1 and
Retailer 3. Transshipment from Retailer 1 to Retailer 2 in the amount of
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Figure 57: Excess demand for Retailer 2. Excess inventory for Retailer 1 and
Retailer 3. Transshipment from Retailer 1 to Retailer 2 in the amount of
.

Figure 58: Excess inventory for Retailer 2 and Retailer 3. Excess demand for
Retailer 1. Transshipment from Retailer 2 to Retailer 1 in the amount of
.
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Figure 59: Excess inventory for Retailer 2 and Retailer 3. Excess demand for
Retailer 1. Transshipment from Retailer 2 to Retailer 1 in the amount of
.

Figure 60: Excess inventory for Retailer 2. Excess demand for Retailer 1 and
Retailer 3. Transshipment from Retailer 2 to Retailer 1 in the amount of
.
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Figure 61: Excess inventory for Retailer 2. Excess demand for Retailer 1 and
Retailer 3. Transshipment from Retailer 2 to Retailer 1 in the amount of
.

Figure 62: Excess inventory for Retailer 2. Excess demand for Retailer 1 and
Retailer 3. Transshipment from Retailer 2 to Retailer 1 in the amount of
.
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Figure 63: Excess inventory for Retailer 2. Excess demand for Retailer 1 and
Retailer 3. Transshipment from Retailer 2 to Retailer 1 in the amount of
.
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Appendix F
Summation of PDFs in Three Retailer System
This appendix gives the Wolfram Mathematica document showing the summation
of the pdfs in the three retailer system.
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This file shows the pdfs that make up the four transshipment operators:
T32, T21, and T23.

T12,

In certain regions of the transshipment operators more than

one transshipment takes place while in other regions only one transshipment takes
place.

In order for simplicity

Clear fl, x, lambda, q1, q2, q3
Distribution
f1 x_ :
lambda
q2

30;

q1

20;

q3

q1;

lambda Exp

lambda x

1 20;

Defining T12, T13, T21, T23
T12pdfs q1_, q2_, q3_ :
Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d3, q3 , Infinity , d1, 0, q1 , d2, q1

q2

d1, Infinity

Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d3, q3 , Infinity , d1, 0, q1 , d2, q2 , q1

Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d2, q2 , q2

q1

Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

d1, 0, q2

d2

d3, 0, q2

d2

Integrate f1 d1
d2, 2 q3

q2

2

q1

2

q3 , d1, q2

f1 d2
2 d3, q1

d2

2

q3 , d3, 0, q2

d2

2

q2

d1

q3 ,

f1 d3 , d2, q2 , q2

q1

q3 ,

q1, q1

f1 d3 , d3, 0, q3 , d1, 0, d3 ,
q2

q3

d1

d3

Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d3, 0, q3 , d1, d3, q1 , d2, q2

Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d3, 0, q3 , d1, 0, d3 , d2, q1

2 q3
q2

2 d3, Infinity

q3

d1

d3, Infinity

T32pdfs q1_, q2_, q3_ :
Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d1, q1, Infinity , d3, 0, q3 , d2, q3

q2

d3, Infinity

Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d1, q1, Infinity , d3, 0, q3 , d2, q2 , q3

Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d2, q2 , q2

d3, 0, q2

d2

2

q3

d1, 0, q2

d2

2

q1 , d3, q2

Integrate f1 d1
d2, 2 q1

q2

f1 d2

2 d1, q1

Integrate f1 d1
d2

2

q1

q3 , d1, 0, q2

f1 d2

d2

2

f1 d3 , d2, q2 , q2

q2

d3

q1 ,
q1

q3 ,

q3 , q3

f1 d3 , d1, 0, q1 , d3, 0, d1 ,
q2

q3

d1

d3

Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d1, 0, q1 , d3, d1, q3 , d2, q2

Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d1, 0, q1 , d3, 0, d1 , d2, q1
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2 q1
q2

q3

2 d1, Infinity
d1

d3, Infinity

T21pdfs q1_, q2_, q3_ :
Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d2, 0, q2 , d3, 0, q3 , d1, q1, q2

Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d2, 0, q2 , d3, 0, q3 , d1, q1

Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d2, 0, q2 , d3, q2

d1, q2

d2

2

Integrate f1 d1

f1 d3 , d2, 0, q2 , d3, q2

d1, q1, q2

d2

2

q1

d3, q3 , q2

d2

2

q3 , d1, q1

d1, q1, q1

f1 d2

q2

d2

q1

d2, Infinity

d2

2

q3 , Infinity ,

d2

2

q3 , Infinity ,

q1, Infinity
f1 d2

Integrate f1 d1

q2

q3

d2

Integrate f1 d1
q2

f1 d2

q3

d2

f1 d3 , d2, 0, q2 ,

d3, Infinity

f1 d3 , d2, 0, q2 , d3, q3 , q2

d2

2

q3 ,

d3

T23pdfs q1_, q2_, q3_ :
Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d2, 0, q2 , d1, 0, q1 , d3, q3 , q2

Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d2, 0, q2 , d1, 0, q1 , d3, q3

Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d2, 0, q2 , d1, q2

d3, q2

d2

2

Integrate f1 d1
d3, q3 , q2

d2

d1, q1, q2

d2

Integrate f1 d1
d3, q3 , q1

q2

d2

q3

d2, Infinity

d2

2

q1, Infinity ,

d2

2

q1, Infinity ,

q3 , Infinity
f1 d2

f1 d3 , d2, 0, q2 , d1, q2

2

q3

Integrate f1 d1

2

q1 , d3, q1

q2

q3

f1 d2

d2

f1 d3 , d2, 0, q2 ,

d1, Infinity

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d2, 0, q2 , d1, q1, q2

q3

d1

d2

Zeropdfs q1_, q2_, q3_ : Integrate f1 d1
Integrate f1 d1

q2

f1 d2

f1 d2

d2

2

q1 ,

f1 d3 , d2, 0, q2 , d1, 0, q1 , d3, 0, q3

f1 d3 , d2, q2 , Infinity , d1, q1, Infinity , d3, q3 , Infinity

Singlepdfs q1_, q2_, q3_ :
Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d3, q3 , Infinity , d1, 0, q1 , d2, q1

q2

d1, Infinity

Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d3, q3 , Infinity , d1, 0, q1 , d2, q2 , q1

q2

Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d1, q1, Infinity , d3, 0, q3 , d2, q3

d3, Infinity

Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d1, q1, Infinity , d3, 0, q3 , d2, q2 , q3

Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d2, 0, q2 , d3, 0, q3 , d1, q1, q2

d2

Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d2, 0, q2 , d3, 0, q3 , d1, q1

d2, Infinity

Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d2, 0, q2 , d1, 0, q1 , d3, q3 , q2

d2

Integrate f1 d1

f1 d2

f1 d3 , d2, 0, q2 , d1, 0, q1 , d3, q3

d2, Infinity

Zeropdfs q1, q2 , q3
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q2
q2

q2

q2

d1
d3

q1
q3

Singlepdfs q1, q2, q3

N

0.805705
T23pdfs q1, q2, q3

T21pdfs q1, q2, q3

Zeropdfs q1, q2, q3
2
9 2

12

7

7 2

2 5

5

4
7 2

2

1
7 2

3 4

T12pdfs q1, q2, q3

T32pdfs q1, q2, q3

Singlepdfs q1, q2, q3
4

2

6

7 2

1

4

7 2

2

1

2

11 4

1

7 2
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Appendix G
Definition of
The following equation is taken from a Wolfram Mathematica file. Here the central
retailer is Retailer 2, and the non-central retailers are Retailer 1 and Retailer 3.
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Appendix H
Definition of
The following equation is taken from a Wolfram Mathematica file. Here the central
retailer is Retailer 2, and the non-central retailers are Retailer 1 and Retailer 3.
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